2026-08-30T10:30:29.179Z / https://www.cnn.com/2026/08/30/politics/iran-losing-leverage-hormuz-mcgurk
布雷特·麦古克是CNN全球事务分析师，曾在乔治·W·布什、巴拉克·奥巴马、唐纳德·特朗普和乔·拜登任内担任高级国家安全职位。
一种关于对伊战争的主流观点开始形成：伊朗赢了。
其论点直截了当。美国和以色列对伊朗发动了数周空袭，造成了巨大破坏，并要求伊朗做出重大让步。伊朗拒绝投降，其政府仍在掌权，其导弹仍对整个地区构成威胁。最重要的是，德黑兰仍有能力扰乱霍尔木兹海峡的航运，推高美国和世界大部分地区的能源成本。今年夏天，特朗普曾警告称，如果海峡被封锁，将引发全球经济衰退。
这一论点颇具说服力，但可能为时过早。
战争是影响力与耐力的较量。而如今的局势与几个月前相比已大不相同。
这场持续六个月的冲突分为四个阶段。第一阶段始于2月28日的密集空袭，一直持续到六周的高强度军事行动。第二阶段始于4月7日的停火与谈判，最终以6月17日特朗普与伊朗总统马苏德·佩泽什基安签署的谅解备忘录告终。第三阶段始于数周后，伊朗再次针对霍尔木兹海峡的商业船只发动袭击，引发了新一轮针锋相对的军事交锋。
正是在这个时候，越来越多的呼声要求美国 effectively 放弃并将海峡的控制权让给伊朗。美国似乎已无计可施。
但未必如此。
自7月中旬以来，美国重新对伊朗港口实施军事封锁，并恢复对伊朗石油贸易的制裁。与此同时，美国军方不知疲倦地清理航道，协助保护途经海峡的商业船只。其结果是对伊朗石油运输的有效封锁，全球石油运输量得以恢复，能源价格也保持了相当的稳定。本周彭博社报道称，霍尔木兹海峡的石油运输量已恢复至战前水平的三分之二。
这意味着如今施压的对象正转向伊朗，而非美国。如果伊朗丧失将海峡作为人质的能力，其影响力将迅速消散。
伊朗在开战前就因多年制裁和经济管理不善而实力受损。如今其处境更为糟糕。
根据国际货币基金组织的数据，伊朗经济今年预计将收缩5%以上，通货膨胀率接近70%。伊朗货币汇率大幅下跌，基本商品价格飙升。伊朗劳工部一名官员近日估计，仅在战争头三个月，就有超过100万个工作岗位消失。
这些数据至关重要，因为伊朗维持冲突的能力最终不仅取决于其剩余的导弹库。开战前，伊朗政权就面临着针对其专制统治和疲软经济的前所未有的民众压力。据报道，已有数千名伊朗人在街头丧生。
或许从一开始，美国更明智的战略应该是通过经济行动支持要求变革的伊朗民众。战争的第一阶段——清除伊朗大部分高层领导人——导致伊朗革命卫队巩固了权力，并进一步镇压了大多数反对其统治的伊朗民众。
但革命卫队需要资源来维持武力统治，而这个新的第四阶段——军事禁运——是伊朗从未面临过的局面。事实上，这是自1979年伊朗革命以来，伊朗首次面临通过霍尔木兹海峡的经济生命线被封锁的局面。
伊朗的出路在于停止威胁海峡内的船只，并放弃其大部分已被摧毁的浓缩铀项目。这是特朗普能够接受的协议。但从革命卫队的角度来看，无论采取上述哪一种行动，都将显得软弱，并威胁到其统治。
德黑兰或许试图通过战斗摆脱这一困境。其在前三个阶段的战略十分明确：威胁海峡内的商业活动，推高全球能源价格和美国国内的汽油价格，增加全球经济压力，最终迫使特朗普让步，尤其是在中期选举临近之际。
伊朗还袭击了海湾国家的能源基础设施，并且有可能再次发动此类袭击。其在也门的代理部队胡塞武装也曾威胁称，将用伊朗的导弹和无人机封锁红海的航运。
所有这些都意味着将诉诸战争早期阶段的 tactics。但从战略上讲，这对伊朗并未奏效。海湾国家对这场战争并不满意，但大多数国家并不支持在霍尔木兹海峡向伊朗的勒索要求让步。伊朗试图用无人机和水雷封锁海峡的行动，如今也首次宣告失败。
因此，我不会低估随着经济压力加大，伊朗升级局势的风险。但在现阶段，这或许不足以缓解这种压力。特朗普似乎比伊朗领导人原本预想的要坚定得多。
伊朗领导层和许多西方分析师认为伊朗对压力具有免疫力。伊朗永远不会放弃其核计划，不会放弃霍尔木兹海峡，也不会放弃其在该地区各地的恐怖主义代理武装。
根据德黑兰的说法，这是我们都必须接受的中东生活现实。
伊朗外交部长阿巴斯·阿拉格奇上周辩称，封锁和制裁压力“注定会失败”，就像以往所有试图改变伊朗政策的行动一样。
我在领导打击“伊斯兰国”的行动时，也曾从专家口中听到过同样的说法。在谈判释放加沙人质时，也听到过类似的论调。
事实上，任何一方都有崩溃的临界点。伊朗以为它找到了特朗普的临界点。但特朗普或许终将找到伊朗的临界点。现在下定论还为时过早。
这场较量或许会以某种形式持续到特朗普总统任期结束，甚至更久。这场冲突已经持续了近五十年。
从美国方面来看，战争的前几个阶段因目标不断变化、定义模糊、立场大幅摇摆以及言论不一致而陷入困境。
但第四阶段似乎有所不同。美国军方有着明确的目标，正如美国中央司令部司令布拉德·库珀上将本周所概述的那样：实施对伊朗的封锁，并保障商业船只的通行。
美国的目标也应该同样明确。伊朗必须放弃对霍尔木兹海峡的主张，并放弃其核浓缩项目。在此之前，这种局面将成为新的现状。
而这种现状——或许是自战争开始以来首次——现在对华盛顿有利，而非德黑兰。
No, Iran is not winning: In Act IV of the war, it’s losing its leverage in Hormuz
2026-08-30T10:30:29.179Z / https://www.cnn.com/2026/08/30/politics/iran-losing-leverage-hormuz-mcgurk
Brett McGurk is a CNN global affairs analyst who served in senior national security positions under Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump and Joe Biden.
A conventional wisdom has begun to settle over the war with Iran: Iran won.
The argument is straightforward. The US and Israel bombed Iran for weeks, inflicted enormous damage, and demanded major concessions. Iran refused to surrender. Its government remains in power. Its missiles remain a threat across the region. And most important, Tehran still has the ability to disrupt shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, imposing higher energy costs on the US and much of the world. Over the summer, Trump warned of a global depression if the Strait remained shut.
That’s a strong argument. But it may have proved premature.
Wars are contests of leverage and endurance. And the contest now looks very different from even a few months ago.
The arc of this six-month conflict has proceeded in four acts. Act One began with intensive airstrikes on February 28 and lasted through six weeks of high-intensity military operations. Act Two began with the April 7 ceasefire and negotiations, culminating with the June 17 MOU signed by Trump and Iran’s president, Masoud Pezeshkian. Act Three began weeks later when Iran chose once again to target commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz, leading to another tit-for-tat military exchange.
That was the moment calls rose for the US effectively to give up and cede control of the Strait to Iran. The United States appeared to be out of options.
Not so fast.
Since mid-July, the US has reimposed its military blockade on Iranian ports and sanctions on Iran’s oil trade. In parallel, the U.S. military has worked tirelessly to clear shipping lanes and help protect commercial ships transiting the Strait. The result has been an effective blockade on Iranian oil shipments, with global shipments recovering and energy prices remaining remarkably stable. Bloomberg reported this week that oil flows through the Strait have recovered to 2/3 of pre-war levels.
That means pressure is now compounding on Iran, and not the US. And if Iran loses its ability to hold the Strait hostage, its leverage dissipates rapidly.
Iran entered the war weakened by years of sanctions and economic mismanagement. Its position today is considerably worse.
According to the International Monetary Fund, Iran’s economy is expected to contract by more than 5% this year, with inflation approaching 70%. The value of Iran’s currency has fallen sharply. Prices for basic goods have soared. An Iranian Labor Ministry official recently estimated that more than one million jobs disappeared during the first three months of the war alone.
These statistics matter because Iran’s ability to sustain the conflict ultimately depends on more than its remaining missile arsenal. Before the war, the Iranian regime confronted unprecedented public pressure against its repressive rule and failing economy. Thousands of Iranians were reportedly killed in the streets.
A better American strategy from the start may have been an economic campaign to support the Iranian people demanding change. The first act of the war — removing most of Iran’s leaders — resulted in consolidation by the Revolutionary Guards and further crackdowns against the majority of Iranians that oppose their rule.
But the Guards require resources to rule by force, and this new fourth act — a military embargo — is something that Iran has never confronted before. Indeed, this is the first time since the 1979 Revolution that Iran has faced a quarantine on its economic lifeline through Hormuz.
Their way out is to stop threatening ships in the Strait and abandon what’s left of its mostly destroyed enrichment program. That’s a deal Trump would accept. Doing either, however, from the vantage point of the Guards would show weakness and threaten their rule.
Tehran may seek to fight its way out of this noose. Its strategy through the first three acts was clear: threaten commerce in the Strait, raise energy prices globally and gasoline prices in the US, increase global economic pressure and ultimately force Trump to back down, particularly with midterm elections approaching.
Iran has also targeted the energy infrastructure of the Gulf states and could do so again. Its proxy force in Yemen, the Houthis, have threatened to shut down commerce through the Red Sea with Iranian missiles and drones.
All that would mean resorting to the same tactics from the early acts of the war. Strategically, it has not worked for Iran. The Gulf states are not happy with the war, but most do not support giving in to Iran’s extortionist demands in the Strait. Iran’s attempts to close the Strait with drones and mines are also now — for the first time — failing.
So, I would not discount the risk of an Iranian escalation as the economic pressure builds. But it may not be enough at this stage to reduce that pressure. Trump appears far more committed than Iranian leaders apparently presumed.
Iranian leaders and many Western analysts project immunity to pressure. Iran will never surrender its nuclear program or the Strait of Hormuz. Or its terrorist proxies around the region.
That’s something we all must accept as a fact of life in the Middle East, according to Tehran.
Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi argued last week that the blockade and sanctions pressure are “bound to fail” just as all other campaigns, he said, had failed to change Iranian policy.
I used to hear the same thing from experts about ISIS, when I was leading the campaign to defeat the group. And Hamas, when negotiating to free the hostages held in Gaza.
In fact, everyone has a breaking point. Iran thought it had found Trump’s. Trump may yet find theirs. It’s too early to call.
This contest in some form may last through the end of Trump’s presidency and beyond. It’s been ongoing for nearly five decades.
The earlier acts in this war were mired from the US side by shifting and ill-defined objectives, widely careening positions, and inconsistent statements.
But Act Four seems different. The US military has a clear objective as outlined this week by the commander of CENTCOM, Admiral Brad Cooper. It is enforcing the blockade on Iran and facilitating the movement of commercial traffic.
The objective for the US should be similarly well-defined. Iran must abandon claims on the Strait and give up the nuclear enrichment program. Until then, this will be the new status quo.
And that status quo — perhaps for the first time since the war began — now favors Washington, not Tehran.