2026-09-10T04:01:29.560Z / https://www.cnn.com/2026/09/10/politics/iran-nuclear-program-inspections-iaea
据外交官员周三宣布，联合国核监督机构正呼吁安理会就伊朗未能遵守旨在防止其发展核武器的保障监督协议一事追究其责任。
据多名前官员、外交官以及CNN查阅的十余年联合国文件显示，这是二十多年来监督伊朗核计划进程的最新转折点——伊朗已从遵守协议逐渐演变为破坏核查工作，例如关闭监控摄像头，以及对核查人员进行“过度侵入性的人身搜查”。
伊朗2015年与美国等多国达成的核协议建立了全球监管最严格的核核查机制，由国际原子能机构（IAEA）负责监督。多年来，德黑兰的核计划一直配合该机构的核查人员工作。
但据国际原子能机构当时的报告显示，在唐纳德·特朗普总统退出该协议后的几年里，伊朗逐渐、系统性地违反其核保障监督义务，该机构随后认定伊朗未申报与核材料相关的场地。
“伊朗方面其实一直在打消耗战，不断为难国际原子能机构获取核查权限，提供的信息荒谬可笑、毫无可信度，”一位不愿具名的前美国外交官告诉CNN，他要求匿名以便自由讨论这一敏感议题。
一位前国际原子能机构官员和一位前美国外交官告诉CNN，联合国核监督机构有时会出于政治原因淡化问题，包括努力避免与伊朗发生对抗。
这一事件暴露出，面对有组织的不遵守协议行为，监控和核查工作存在局限性。顶尖专家因此认为，即便通过外交途径找到新的核协议解决方案，也不足以阻止伊朗获得核武器。
“我认为，无论是从技术层面还是政治层面来看……如果伊朗现在想要拥有核弹，它一定能成功，”卡内基国际和平基金会核政策部门负责人、物理学家詹姆斯·阿克顿说道。
阿克顿告诉CNN，他认为“伊朗在未来三年内获得核弹的概率为50%”。
国际原子能机构的23个成员国周三投票决定将伊朗问题提交至安理会，俄罗斯、中国和尼日尔投了反对票。此次行动源于2025年6月通过的一项决议，该决议认定伊朗违反核保障监督协议。
该决议通过七个月后，爆发了当前的伊朗战事，几天后美国发动“午夜铁锤行动”，打击了伊朗的核设施。
伊朗上一次被提交至安理会是在2006年初，联合国安理会随后采取了一系列行动，包括对伊朗政权实施制裁。目前尚不清楚安理会是否会对周三的提交行为做出类似回应；俄罗斯和中国作为安理会常任理事国，有权单方面否决相关提案。
伊朗驻国际原子能机构代表团在社交媒体发表声明，谴责该决议“具有政治性质”且“未经协商一致通过”。
国际原子能机构与《联合全面行动计划》
2015年达成的协议即《联合全面行动计划》（JCPOA），历经20个月的密集谈判最终达成。该协议对伊朗的核计划施加了严格限制，尤其是在铀浓缩活动方面，并由国际原子能机构进行独立核查。
《联合全面行动计划》对伊朗的浓缩铀库存设定了长达十年甚至更久的严格限制，促使伊朗将大部分过剩铀运往俄罗斯销毁。该协议还限制了离心机制备、钚后处理、核武器设计及其他相关领域的活动。
该协议还允许国际原子能机构实施全球最具侵入性的监控计划：安装封条、摄像头、传感器，开展每日实地核查，并设立机制调查疑似秘密核设施。
2016年1月协议生效时，国际原子能机构证实伊朗正在遵守协议条款。尽管美国在2018年5月退出《联合全面行动计划》，但直到2019年年中，伊朗仍遵守协议中关于核查人员准入的要求，以及其对离心浓缩机和申报铀库存的保障监督规定。
但据国际原子能机构每季度发布一次的报告显示，伊朗的遵守情况在2019年开始瓦解。
2019年7月，核查人员报告称，伊朗积累的低浓缩铀已突破《联合全面行动计划》规定的核材料上限。同年秋季，德黑兰在协议禁止开展此类活动的设施中，恢复使用先进离心机进行浓缩活动。
2020年，伊朗阻止国际原子能机构核查人员进入《联合全面行动计划》签署前疑似用于核相关活动的两处场地。
2020年12月，伊朗议会通过一项法律，大幅削减与国际原子能机构在强化监控和核查条款方面的合作，进一步限制了核查权限。该法律是在以色列刺杀一名伊朗顶级科学家后通过的，同时还要求加速伊朗的核计划——包括将铀浓缩至60%纯度——除非美国减少制裁。60%是一个关键阈值，可快速进一步加工至武器级纯度。
伊朗最初同意保留国际原子能机构的监控设备并将数据本地存储，但该协议在2021年中期破裂。同年夏季，伊朗方面关闭了卡拉季一座离心机车间的监控摄像头，并损毁了其中一台，随后在2022年6月，即约一年后，要求该机构移除所有根据《联合全面行动计划》安装的监控设备。
该机构称，2021年，伊朗安全部队成员还通过“过度侵入性的人身搜查”对国际原子能机构核查人员进行恐吓。
2023年1月，国际原子能机构在福特沃斯核设施发现一台未申报的离心机，其铀浓缩纯度高达83.7%，接近武器级纯度（约90%）。
这位前美国外交官表示，此次发现是由一名经验丰富的俄罗斯核查人员通过细微观察离心机管道的变化发现的。数月后，伊朗将这名核查人员和其他几名国际原子能机构铀浓缩专家驱逐出境。
国际原子能机构总干事拉斐尔·格罗西将驱逐核查人员一事描述为对该机构监控伊朗核计划能力的“极其严重的打击”。
随后几年里，两国关系进一步恶化，伊朗与国际原子能机构相互指责对方从事间谍活动。
这些干扰行为、持续的浓缩活动以及对未申报核场地的隐瞒，促使该机构在2025年6月通过一项决议，认定伊朗违反了其防扩散承诺。决议通过次日，以色列发动了对伊朗的空袭，不到两周后，美国轰炸了福特沃斯、纳坦兹和伊斯法罕的三处关键核设施。
伊朗代表过去曾驳斥国际原子能机构的指控，并尖锐批评周三基于2025年6月调查结果通过的提交安理会决议。伊朗方面在投票前的声明中称，该机构从未“核实过核材料被转移”。
德黑兰的外交官声称，支持将伊朗问题提交安理会的美国和其他西方国家“为核不扩散问题假惺惺地掉眼泪，却虚伪地拒绝哪怕口头谴责针对受保障监督的和平核设施史无前例的大规模侵略、残酷战争罪和反人类罪”。
自2026年2月美国和以色列对伊朗发动空袭以来，国际原子能机构除了布什尔核电站外，无法访问任何伊朗核设施。
核查人员也未能访问2025年6月被美国和以色列轰炸过的核设施。无法进入现场的情况，加剧了2021年初国际原子能机构对离心机生产、运输和安装监控的失效。
国际原子能机构官员强调，此次核查中断打破了该机构对伊朗铀材料、离心浓缩机及相关受监控物品的“知识连续性”。这意味着该机构无法保证这些物品的状态、数量或位置。
接受CNN采访的专家表示，重建这一监控基线对该机构来说是一项艰巨的任务。
埃里克·布鲁尔曾担任美国国家安全委员会反扩散主管，目前在非营利组织“核威胁倡议”从事防扩散研究。他告诉CNN：“国际原子能机构在了解伊朗当地实际情况方面，目前存在相当严重的信息缺口。”
“他们需要更强大的监控手段，花费更长时间重新建立新的监控基线，才能尝试拼凑出完整的局面，”布鲁尔说道。
安理会最终将决定伊朗是否会因其被指控违反《不扩散核武器条约》而面临新的国际制裁。
在2006年的上一次提交事件后，安理会通过了一系列决议，对德黑兰实施了严厉的经济制裁。
但鉴于美国目前正对伊朗采取军事和经济行动，目前尚不清楚额外制裁会产生何种影响，也不清楚安理会相关决议能否绕过俄罗斯和中国的否决权。
戴维斯·温基的CNN报道得到了Outrider基金会与新闻资助伙伴组织（JFP）的合作支持。CNN对报道保留完全的编辑控制权。
CNN的阿尔皮塔·达西卡为本报道提供了研究支持。
Cameras disabled, inspectors blocked: Nuclear watchdog asks for help with Iran
2026-09-10T04:01:29.560Z / https://www.cnn.com/2026/09/10/politics/iran-nuclear-program-inspections-iaea
The UN’s nuclear watchdog agency is asking the body to hold Iran accountable for failing to stick with safeguards meant to prevent the development of nuclear weapons, diplomatic officials announced Wednesday.
It’s the latest chapter in a more than decade-long effort to keep an eye on Iran that has seen the country descend from compliance to sabotaging inspection efforts – such as disabling monitoring cameras and “excessively invasive physical searches” of inspectors – according to multiple former officials, diplomats and more than a decade of UN documents reviewed by CNN.
Iran’s 2015 nuclear deal with the US and other countries established the world’s most invasive nuclear inspection regime, overseen by the International Atomic Energy Agency. And for years, Tehran’s nuclear program complied with the agency’s inspectors.
But during the years after President Donald Trump withdrew from that deal, Iran gradually and systematically defied its nuclear safeguards, according to contemporaneous IAEA reporting, and the agency later concluded that Iran failed to disclose nuclear material-related sites.
“The Iranians were really playing rope-a-dope and consistently making it hard for the IAEA to get access, presenting information that was laughably not true or plausible,” said a former US diplomat whom CNN granted anonymity to freely discuss the sensitive topic.
The UN nuclear watchdog sometimes downplayed issues for political reasons, including efforts to be less confrontational with Iran, a former IAEA official and a former US diplomat told CNN.
The saga demonstrates the limitations of monitoring and verification in the face of concerted noncompliance, leading top experts to argue that even a full diplomatic solution to the war that includes a new nuclear deal won’t be enough to stop Iran from getting a nuclear bomb.
“I think for both technical and political reasons … if Iran wants to get the bomb at this point, it’s going to get it,” said James Acton, a physicist who heads the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s nuclear policy division.
Acton told CNN he believes “there’s a 50-50 chance that Iran gets the bomb” within the next three years.
23 governors sitting on the International Atomic Energy Agency voted Wednesday to report Tehran to the Security Council, with Russia, China and Niger voting against the action, which stems from a June 2025 resolution declaring Iran non-compliant with nuclear safeguards.
That resolution came seven months before the current war with Iran, and days before US strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities in Operation Midnight Hammer.
Tehran was last reported to the Security Council in early 2006, and the UN body responded with a cascade of actions including sanctions against the regime. It’s unclear whether the Security Council will respond similarly to Wednesday’s report; Russia and China are permanent members of the body who may unilaterally veto proposed actions.
Iran’s diplomatic mission to the IAEA decried the resolution as “political” and “nonconsensually adopted” in a statement on social media.
IAEA and the JCPOA
The 2015 deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA, followed 20 months of intense negotiations. The JCPOA placed strict limits on the country’s nuclear program — especially around uranium enrichment activity — that would be independently verified by the IAEA.
The JCPOA placed strict limits lasting a decade or more on Iran’s enriched uranium stocks and resulted in the country shipping most of its excess uranium to Russia for destruction. The agreement restricted enrichment centrifuge manufacturing, plutonium reprocessing, nuclear weapons design and other related areas.
The deal also permitted the IAEA to enact the most intrusive monitoring scheme on the planet: seals, cameras, sensors, daily in-person inspections, and a mechanism to investigate suspected covert nuclear facilities.
When the deal went into force in January 2016, the IAEA certified that the Iranians were following its terms. And until mid-2019, Iran remained in compliance with the deal’s access requirements and safeguards on its enrichment centrifuges and declared uranium stockpile despite Trump pulling out of the JCPOA in May 2018.
But Iranian compliance began to unravel in 2019, according to the IAEA’s reports, which were issued on a roughly quarterly basis.
In July 2019, inspectors reported that Iran had accumulated enough low enriched uranium to break the JCOPA’s cap on nuclear material. That fall, Tehran resumed enrichment using advanced centrifuges in facilities where the agreement had banned such work.
Then in 2020, Iran blocked IAEA inspectors from accessing two locations suspected of being used for nuclear-related activities before the JCPOA was signed.
IAEA access was curtailed further after Iran’s parliament passed a law in December 2020 that slashed cooperation with the watchdog agency on enhanced monitoring and verification provisions. The law, passed in the wake of Israel killing a top Iranian scientist, also directed the acceleration of Tehran’s nuclear program — to include enriching uranium to 60% purity — unless the US reduced sanctions. 60% is a key threshold that enables rapid further processing into weapons-grade material.
Iran initially agreed to keep IAEA monitoring equipment installed and store the data locally, but that agreement collapsed in mid-2021 — that summer, the Iranians disabled monitoring cameras, destroying one, in a centrifuge workshop in Karaj before demanding the agency remove all its JCPOA monitoring equipment about a year later in June 2022.
Members of Iran’s security forces also intimidated IAEA inspectors through “excessively invasive physical searches” in 2021, the agency said.
The IAEA discovered an undeclared set of centrifuges at the Fordow nuclear facility in January 2023 that were enriching uranium up to 83.7% purity, a level nearing weapons grade (about 90%).
The discovery came when an experienced Russian inspector spotted a subtle change to centrifuge piping, the former US diplomat said. Months later, Iran kicked that inspector and several other IAEA uranium enrichment experts out of the country.
Rafael Grossi, the IAEA’s chief, described the booting of the inspectors as a “very serious blow” to the agency’s ability to monitor Iran’s nuclear program.
The relationship deteriorated further in subsequent years, with Iran and the IAEA trading allegations of espionage.
The interference, continued enrichment and lack of candor regarding undeclared nuclear sites led the agency to pass a resolution declaring Iran in violation of its nonproliferation promises in June 2025. Israel launched strikes against Iran the day after the resolution passed, and the US bombed three key nuclear sites at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan less than two weeks later.
Iran’s representatives have disputed the IAEA claims in the past and sharply criticized Wednesday’s referral resolution that built upon the June 2025 finding. In their statement before the vote, the Iranians argued that the agency never “verified the diversion of nuclear materials.”
Tehran’s diplomats claimed that the US and other Western states sponsoring the Security Council referral “shed crocodile tears over proliferation while hypocritically evading even a simple verbal condemnation of unprecedented massive aggressions against peaceful safeguarded nuclear facilities, brutal war crimes, and crimes against humanity.”
Since February 2026, when the US and Israel launched their air campaign against Iran, the IAEA has been unable to visit any Iranian nuclear facility other than the Bushehr nuclear power plant.
Inspectors have not visited the nuclear facilities previously bombed by the US and Israel in June 2025, either. The lack of access compounds the early 2021 lapse of IAEA monitoring of centrifuge production, movement and installation.
IAEA officials have stressed that the inspection blackout broke the agency’s “continuity of knowledge” on Iran’s uranium, enrichment centrifuges and related items under the watchdog’s monitoring. That means it cannot vouch for the status, amount or location of those items.
Reestablishing that monitoring baseline poses a monumental task for the agency, according to experts who spoke with CNN.
Eric Brewer, a former National Security Council counterproliferation director who now researches nonproliferation at the Nuclear Threat Initiative nonprofit, told CNN that “the IAEA is starting from a pretty massive deficit when it comes to understanding the picture on the ground in Iran.”
“They would need to have much stronger monitoring and a much longer time to go back in and establish a new monitoring baseline to try to put the pieces of the puzzle back together,” Brewer said.
The Security Council will ultimately determine whether Iran will face new international consequences for its alleged violation of the non-proliferation treaty.
After the last such report in 2006, the body passed a series of resolutions that enabled crushing economic sanctions on Tehran.
But with the US currently taking military and economic action against Iran, it’s unclear what impact additional actions would have, and it’s unclear whether any Security Council resolutions on the matter would make it past the veto powers that Russia and China hold.
Davis Winkie’s work at CNN is supported by a partnership between Outrider Foundation and Journalism Funding Partners (JFP). CNN retains full editorial control of the reporting.
CNN’s Arpita Dasika contributed research to this story.