2026-08-16T10:00:29.228Z / https://www.cnn.com/2026/08/16/politics/democrats-midwest-midterms
美国中部的民主党人正在卷土重来。
今年，民主党在中西部工业区和农业带的州长与参议员竞选攻势之猛烈，是自奥巴马总统任期早期以来从未有过的。
尽管该党仍面临许多中部选民的强烈质疑，尤其是在文化议题上，但民众对生活成本高企的不满已经削弱了共和党对美国中部地区的掌控。两党不仅在密歇根州、威斯康星州等传统摇摆州展开激烈的州长和/或参议员竞选，还在奥巴马时代之后彻底变红的州——包括俄亥俄州、艾奥瓦州，甚至可能包括内布拉斯加州和堪萨斯州——陷入竞争。
“这些州都已进入竞选版图，”曾在艾奥瓦州及该地区其他州工作过的资深共和党战略师大卫·科赫尔说道。
每场竞选都有其独特的本地动态。但共同的主线是，唐纳德·特朗普总统在2024年几乎全票拿下的这些州，其支持率正在下滑——其中包括在工人阶级白人和农村选民中出现明显的支持率回落，而这两类选民在这些地区的选民中占比极高。
“他们在2024年被兜售了一套说辞，称他们的生活会变得更轻松——但实际上生活反而变得艰难得多了，”美国桥梁组织的付费媒体与合作主管伊娃·坎普说道。该组织是一家民主党倡导团体，致力于重新争取工人阶级选民。
在这片广阔的竞选战场上，关键的竞选结果可能取决于两件事：共和党能否提醒倾向保守的选民，自奥巴马时代以来他们为何会对民主党愈发不信任；或是民主党能否让选民聚焦于他们当下对特朗普和经济的不满情绪。
“在特朗普第一任期，你在农村地区会听到人们私下跟你说，‘我不想让别人知道我是民主党人’，”前北达科他州民主党参议员、“一国计划”创始人海蒂·海特坎普说道。该组织致力于推动民主党在美国农村地区复兴。“现在越来越多的人愿意站出来说，‘这不正常，这不对，你本可以做得更好’。”
奥巴马就职时，工业中心地带和农业带仍处于两党激烈竞争的状态。
不同的分析人士对哪些州属于这一范畴有不同的界定。但从西到东的一种划分方式可能包括：北达科他州、南达科他州、内布拉斯加州和堪萨斯州；明尼苏达州、艾奥瓦州和密苏里州；威斯康星州、伊利诺伊州、密歇根州、印第安纳州、俄亥俄州以及宾夕法尼亚州（该州坚决反对被归为中西部，但政治表现通常和中西部州一致）。
2009年，民主党掌控了上述13个州中的18个参议院席位，以及13个州长职位中的8个。如今看来这或许难以置信，但当时民主党在北达科他州拿下了两个参议院席位，在南达科他州、内布拉斯加州、艾奥瓦州和印第安纳州各拿下一个。奥巴马在2008年大选中赢得了其中8个州的支持。海特坎普表示，在那个时候，“人们的党派忠诚度没那么强，更愿意为政绩投票”。
随后的十年是民主党衰落的十年。最大的打击来自2010年中期选举，选民对奥巴马动荡的前两年任期发起反弹。2010年，民主党在北达科他州、印第安纳州、威斯康星州、宾夕法尼亚州甚至奥巴马的家乡伊利诺伊州丢失了参议院席位。共和党同时拿下了艾奥瓦州、堪萨斯州、密歇根州、俄亥俄州、宾夕法尼亚州和威斯康星州的州长职位。
奥巴马在2012年连任竞选期间在该地区表现出色，但民主党随后在2012年、2014年，尤其是2018年的参议院选举中进一步失利（海特坎普以及密苏里州和印第安纳州的现任参议员均落选）。
如今，经过这些政治格局变化，参议院的党派平衡已与2009年完全反转：共和党目前掌控了这些州26个参议院席位中的18个。共和党还拿下了13个州长职位中的7个，而奥巴马就职时民主党掌控了其中8个。海特坎普表示，共和党日益倾向于支持联邦农业补贴，以及民主党在社会议题上的左转，共同加速了这一反转。
在总统选举层面，民主党同样遭遇重挫。2024年，卡玛拉·哈里斯输掉了除 reliably blue 伊利诺伊州和明尼苏达州之外的所有上述州，特朗普在俄亥俄州和艾奥瓦州等前摇摆州的得票率飙升至55%以上。对于2024年大选后惊魂未定的民主党人来说，中部地区看起来更像是一片政治荒原。
两年后的今天，民主党迎来了多年来最佳的机会，重新在中西部站稳脚跟。
在州长竞选方面，民主党有望稳稳保住宾夕法尼亚州、伊利诺伊州（现任州长乔希·夏皮罗和J·B·普里茨克尔）和明尼苏达州的席位——参议员艾米·克洛布查尔极有可能接替因该州福利欺诈丑闻而声望受损的蒂姆·瓦尔茨。在密歇根州，民主党籍州务卿乔斯琳·本森有望在开放式席位竞选中击败共和党人约翰·詹姆斯。
在大卫·克劳利上周击败社会主义候选人弗朗西斯卡·洪赢得戏剧性的初选胜利后，民主党战略人士认为，密尔沃基县县长在威斯康星州的开放式席位竞选中比共和党议员汤姆·蒂芙尼更具胜算。民主党自2006年以来就没能在艾奥瓦州和俄亥俄州选出州长。但在艾奥瓦州，州审计官民主党人罗布·桑德在与共和党人扎克·拉恩的竞选中处于有利位置。在俄亥俄州，前州卫生部门主任民主党人艾米·阿克顿与前共和党总统候选人维韦克·拉马斯瓦米的竞争十分胶着。
民主党认为，他们在堪萨斯州接替即将卸任的民主党州长劳拉·凯利的竞选中仍具竞争力，并将内布拉斯加州视为挑战共和党州长吉姆·皮伦的“潜在爆冷机会”。
在参议院竞选方面，民主党最有可能拿下共和党席位的机会在于俄亥俄州（前参议员谢罗德·布朗可能已对共和党人乔恩·赫斯特德建立优势）和艾奥瓦州（共和党联邦众议员阿什利·辛森被认为以微弱优势领先民主党州众议员乔希·图雷克）。在堪萨斯州（参议员罗杰·马歇尔）和内布拉斯加州（参议员皮特·里基茨），民主党人亚当·汉密尔顿——一位卫理公会牧师——以及独立候选人丹·奥斯本——一位民粹主义海军退伍军人、前工会官员——尽管胜算渺茫，但仍具备竞争力。
与州长竞选形成对比的是，中部地区民主党人面临两项严峻挑战，需要保住参议院席位——这些州提名的候选人比典型的中西部候选人要左得多。在密歇根州经历分裂的初选后，阿卜杜勒·埃尔赛义德必须扩大吸引力，对抗共和党人迈克·罗杰斯；在另一场意识形态分裂的初选后，民主党副州长佩吉·弗拉纳根在更加倾向民主党的明尼苏达州处境更好，尤其是在联邦特工枪杀两名当地居民引发的反弹之后——但她可能会因与该州新冠时代的欺诈丑闻有牵连而受损。
两党还在宾夕法尼亚州的四个竞争激烈的众议院席位、艾奥瓦州、俄亥俄州和密歇根州各三个席位，以及内布拉斯加州和威斯康星州各一个席位上展开角逐。从各个方面来看，美国中部都已成为2026年政治斗争的核心地带。
尽管这些竞选不可避免地存在地方差异，但它们都为两党带来了几大相似的动态，首先就是竞选辩论的基调。“归根结底，民主党希望的是，民众的经济生活现实能成为关键因素，他们会说‘共和党掌权了，我要怪他们’，”科赫尔说道，这一观点得到了许多民主党人的呼应。“如果共和党成功了，那就是‘我不想回到乔·拜登执政时的样子’。”
根据布鲁金斯都会区智库的人口学家威廉·弗雷的分析数据，民主党面临的共同人口挑战在于：没有四年制大学学位的白人选民——特朗普的核心支持者——在2024年占了许多上述州一半甚至更多的选票，包括威斯康星州、艾奥瓦州和密歇根州，在包括俄亥俄州、宾夕法尼亚州和明尼苏达州在内的大多数其他州也占到近一半。除伊利诺伊州外，所有这些州的农村人口占比都高于全国平均水平。
自21世纪初以来，共和党得以巩固在中部各州的统治地位，关键在于民主党在白人工人阶级和农村选民这两个重叠群体中的支持率暴跌。在这一撤退过程中，民主党在人口中心保住了阵地，甚至有所进展。例如，哈里斯在2024年拿下了俄亥俄州围绕哥伦布的富裕富兰克林郡，优势比奥巴马2008年时还要大，在围绕得梅因的波尔克郡，她的得票率仅比奥巴马低2个百分点。
然而，尽管奥巴马在2008年轻松拿下这两个州，但哈里斯在2024年以两位数差距落败。在这两个州，民主党遭受了“千刀万剐”式的失利——共和党在中等规模和更小的城镇中不断取得进展。
2026年，民主党有理由期待能够重新获得该地区2024年转向特朗普的少数族裔选民的支持，因为特朗普在非白人成年人中的全国支持率大幅下滑。同时，民主党有望在受过大学教育的白人选民中比2024年表现更好。过去几个月的民调显示，在威斯康星州、俄亥俄州、艾奥瓦州和宾夕法尼亚州，拥有至少四年制大学学位的白人选民中，特朗普的不支持率已超过60%。
这些态度意味着，在竞争激烈的选战中，如果民主党能够在共和党最核心的选民群体中取得任何程度的支持率提升，他们就将处于有利位置。在这些文化保守的州，民主党几乎不可能赢得大多数蓝领白人选民或农村选民的支持。但考虑到他们在其他群体中可能取得的进展，只要在共和党占主导的小镇据点中失利幅度缩小，对民主党来说可能就足够了。
在该地区拥有丰富经验的民主党战略家皮特·吉安格雷科指出，这一动态是民主党在艾奥瓦州和俄亥俄州——两个流失已久的中部最重要的竞选阵地——获胜的关键。
让俄亥俄州和艾奥瓦州重新进入竞选版图的原因是，“（它们）的深红色地区正在变成浅红色，这意义重大，”吉安格雷科说道。“当你在某些县的失利幅度从60至70个百分点缩小到50个百分点时，局势就完全不同了。”
就目前而言，经济是民主党希望在中部各州重新赢得蓝领白人和农村居民支持的最佳抓手。2024年，在所有进行了出口民调的上述州中，特朗普在没有四年制大学学位的白人选民中取得了巨大优势。但民众对他的经济政绩的失望，已经将他在这些选民中的支持率拉至宾夕法尼亚州和威斯康星州的50%左右，在俄亥俄州则略高于50%。
同样，中部地区的农民正面临困境：燃油和化肥成本上涨，以及特朗普关税引发的国际争端打乱了出口市场。艾奥瓦州最近的一项研究计算显示，该州五分之一的农场“终于陷入脆弱境地”，这一比例是2022年的两倍多。
特朗普的支持率下滑不仅因为选民普遍对经济不满，还因为许多人认为他的政策加剧了他们的困境——例如，伊朗局势直接推高了汽油价格。“人们不需要芝加哥大学的经济学论文来解释汽油价格为何上涨，”吉安格雷科说道。2025年共和党税改法案中的医疗补助削减计划给农村医院带来了不成比例的压力，这是又一个痛点。
尽管两党许多民选官员和政治战略家长期以来认为关税对工人阶级选民有吸引力，但坎普表示，即使是蓝领白人男性也已经不情愿地转而反对关税，因为它们推高了物价。“尽管他们可能希望制造业回流美国，但他们在焦点小组中表示，关税让他们的日常生活变得更艰难，”她说道。
面对所有这些不利因素，共和党并非毫无招架之力。《统一宏伟法案》设立了500亿美元的专项基金用于农村医院。特朗普希望今年再向农场提供500亿美元的联邦补贴，根据环境工作小组——一家环境分析与倡导组织——最近的分析，这笔补贴大约相当于农民总收入的三分之一。该组织高级农业与气候研究主任安妮·舍钦格表示，通常情况下，联邦补贴仅占农场收入的约十分之一。
威斯康星州资深共和党战略家马克·格劳尔表示，共和党人的关键，尤其是在州长选举中，是试图将竞选与华盛顿的不满情绪脱钩。“你必须让选举本地化，尽最大努力不让民主党将这场竞选变成对华盛顿特区发生的一切的全民公投，”格劳尔说道。
但正如格劳尔所指出的，这并不容易。他在2006年为共和党议员马克·格林运营威斯康星州州长竞选时就曾领教过这一点，当时格林因民众对另一位共和党总统（乔治·W·布什）发动的另一场中东战争（伊拉克）的普遍不满而落败。“我亲身经历过，”格劳尔叹了口气说道。“我知道这有多难。”
尽管如此，尽管这些州的民调显示民众对特朗普的疑虑重重，但民调也明确表明，民主党自身的形象也并未得到多少改善，尤其是在关键的非大学学历和农村选民群体中。“你可以整天谈论特朗普在这些选民群体中受到了哪些打击，但唯一更不受欢迎的是民主党，”科赫尔说道。
在今年民主党参与竞选的许多中部州，他们仍需要一场完美风暴才能获胜。但高油价、农场收入低迷、不受欢迎的战争、反复无常的总统，以及强有力的候选人招募，或许真能促成这场完美风暴，这看起来已经不再是不可能的事了。
Why the middle of the country is back in the center of American politics
2026-08-16T10:00:29.228Z / https://www.cnn.com/2026/08/16/politics/democrats-midwest-midterms
The heartland Democrat is making a comeback.
Democrats this year are seriously contesting more races for governor and senator across the industrial Midwest and Farm Belt than at any point since the early years of Barack Obama’s presidency.
The party still faces substantial skepticism from many heartland voters, especially on cultural issues, but frustration over the high cost of living has loosened the GOP’s grip on the middle of the country. The two parties are locked in competitive governor and/or Senate races not only in traditional battlegrounds such as Michigan and Wisconsin, but also in states that moved solidly red since Obama’s era — including Ohio, Iowa, and maybe even Nebraska and Kansas.
“These states are all on the playing field,” says David Kochel, a longtime GOP strategist who has worked in Iowa and elsewhere across the region.
Each race presents some unique local dynamics. But the common theme is the erosion of President Donald Trump’s support in states that almost all went in his favor in 2024 — including a notable decline among the working-class White and rural voters who represent such an outsize share of the electorate in these places.
“They were sold a bill of goods in 2024 that their life was going to get easier — and it’s got a hell of a lot harder,” says Eva Kemp, director of paid media and partnerships at American Bridge, a Democratic advocacy group that focuses on recapturing working-class voters.
Across this broad battlefield, the key races may turn on whether Republicans can remind conservative-leaning voters of why they have grown so skeptical of Democrats since Obama’s day — or if Democrats can keep them focused on their immediate disenchantment with Trump and the economy.
“In the first Trump term what you would see in rural areas is people whispering to you, like, ‘I don’t want anyone to know I’m a Democrat,’” says Heidi Heitkamp a former Democratic Senator from North Dakota and founder of the One Country Project, a group promoting the party’s revival in rural America. “Now there are more and more people willing to say, ‘This is not normal, this is not right, and you know better.’”
When Barack Obama took office, the industrial heartland and the Farm Belt remained highly competitive between the two parties.
Different analysts use different boundaries when describing which states fit under those headings. But one definition, running from West to East, might include North and South Dakota, Nebraska and Kansas; Minnesota, Iowa and Missouri; Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan, Indiana, Ohio and Pennsylvania (which emphatically does not like to be classified as part of the Midwest, but usually behaves like it politically.)
In 2009, Democrats controlled 18 of the 26 Senate seats from those 13 states, and eight of their 13 governorships. It might seem unimaginable today, but Democrats then held both Senate seats in North Dakota, as well as single seats in South Dakota, Nebraska, Iowa and Indiana. Obama carried eight of those 13 states in 2008. At that point, “people were less tribal and more willing to reward performance,” says Heitkamp.
What followed was a decade of decline for Democrats. The big blow was the 2010 midterm backlash against Obama’s tumultuous first two years. In 2010, Democrats lost Senate seats in North Dakota, Indiana, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania and even Illinois, Obama’s home state. Republicans simultaneously flipped control of governor’s mansions in Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.
Obama rallied to run well across the region in his 2012 reelection. But Democrats then suffered further Senate losses there in 2012, 2014 and especially 2018 (when Heitkamp and incumbents in Missouri and Indiana were ousted).
Today, after all these shifts, the partisan balance in the Senate has inverted from 2009: Republicans now hold 18 of these states’ 26 Senate seats. Republicans also control 7 of the 13 governorships, compared to five when Obama took office. Heitkamp says the growing willingness of Republicans to support federal farm subsidies, and the Democratic Party’s turn left on social issues, both accelerated the reversal.
At the presidential level, Democrats have fallen just as hard. In 2024, Kamala Harris lost all these states except reliably blue Illinois and Minnesota, with Trump’s share of the vote soaring to 55% or more in the former battlegrounds of Ohio and Iowa. For dazed Democrats emerging from 2024, the heartland looked more like a wasteland.
Two years later, Democrats have their best opportunity in years to regain a foothold in the Midwest.
In governor’s races, Democrats are strongly favored to hold seats in Pennsylvania and Illinois (behind incumbents Josh Shapiro and J.B. Pritzker) and Minnesota (where Sen. Amy Klobuchar is heavily favored to succeed Tim Walz, who has been weakened by the state’s welfare fraud scandal.) In Michigan, Democratic Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson is favored over Republican John James in an open seat race.
After David Crowley’s dramatic comeback primary victory over socialist Francesca Hong last week, Democratic strategists believe the Milwaukee County executive holds a better hand than Republican Rep. Tom Tiffany for Wisconsin’s open seat. Democrats haven’t elected a governor since 2006 in either Iowa or Ohio. But in Iowa, Democrat Rob Sand, the state auditor, is in a strong position against Republican Zach Lahn. In Ohio, Democrat Amy Acton, the former state Health Department director, is locked in a tight race with former GOP presidential candidate Vivek Ramaswamy.
Democrats believe they remain competitive in the race to succeed outgoing Democratic Gov. Laura Kelley in Kansas and consider Nebraska a “sleeper” opportunity against GOP Gov. Jim Pillen.
In Senate races, the Democrats’ best opportunities to flip Republican seats are in Ohio (where former Sen. Sherrod Brown may have established an edge over Republican Jon Husted) and Iowa (where Republican US Rep. Ashley Hinson is considered a slight favorite over Democratic State Rep. Josh Turek). Democrat Adam Hamilton, a Methodist minister, and independent Dan Osborn, a populist Navy veteran and former union official, remain viable, if longer-shot, possibilities against low-key Republican incumbents in Kansas (Sen. Roger Marshall) and Nebraska (Sen. Pete Ricketts.)
In contrast with the governors’ contests, heartland Democrats face two serious challenges to hold Senate seats in states where they have chosen nominees much more liberal than their typical Midwestern candidates. After a divisive primary in Michigan, Abdul El-Sayed must broaden his appeal against Republican Mike Rogers; after another ideologically divisive primary, Democrat Peggy Flanagan, the lieutenant governor, is in a better position in more reliably blue Minnesota, particularly after the backlash against the killings of two local residents by federal agents — but she will likely be hurt by her proximity to the state’s Covid-era fraud scandal.
The two parties are battling as well over four highly competitive House seats in Pennsylvania; three each in Iowa, Ohio and Michigan; and one in both Nebraska and Wisconsin. In all these ways, the middle of the country is at the center of 2026’s political struggle.
For all their inevitable local variation, these races present each party with several similar dynamics, starting with the nature of the campaign debate. “At the end of the day, Democrats are hoping what (matters) is people’s lived reality on the economy and that they are going to say, ‘the Republicans are in charge and I blame them,’” says Kochel, in a view echoed by many Democrats. “If Republicans are successful, it’s that ‘I don’t want to go back to what Joe Biden was doing.’”
The common demographic challenge for Democrats is that White voters without a four-year college degree — Trump’s core group — cast half or more of the votes in 2024 in many of these states, including Wisconsin, Iowa and Michigan, and just under half in most of the rest, including Ohio, Pennsylvania and Minnesota, according to census data analyzed by demographer William Frey of the Brookings Metro think tank. And apart from Illinois, all these states also rank above the national average in the share of their population that lives in rural areas, according to census figures.
The key to the Republican consolidation of the heartland states since the early 2000s has been the Democrats’ collapse with these overlapping constituencies of White working-class and rural voters. Amid this retreat, Democrats have held their own — and even gained ground — in population centers. Harris, for instance, won Ohio’s prosperous Franklin County, around Columbus, by an even larger margin in 2024 than Obama did in 2008, and ran only 2 points below his total in Polk County, which revolves around Des Moines.
Yet, while Obama comfortably carried both states in 2008, Harris lost each by double digits. In both states, Democrats have suffered death by a thousand cuts — relentless Republican gains in mid-sized and smaller places.
In 2026, Democrats can reasonably expect to recover with minority voters across the region who moved toward Trump in 2024, given the sharp decline in his national approval among nonwhite adults. And Democrats are on track to run better than in 2024 among college-educated White voters. Public polls in the past few months have shown Trump’s disapproval rating rising past 60% among White voters with at least a four-year degree in Wisconsin, Ohio, Iowa and Pennsylvania.
Those attitudes mean that, in competitive races, Democrats will be well positioned if they can show almost any improvement among the GOP’s best constituencies. In these culturally conservative states, Democrats remain highly unlikely to win most blue-collar White or rural voters. But, given their likely gains elsewhere, it may be enough for the party just to lose by less in the GOP’s small-town strongholds.
Pete Giangreco, a Democratic strategist with extensive experience across the region, points to that dynamic as the key to Democratic chances in Iowa and Ohio, the two biggest heartland prizes that have drifted away.
What’s brought Ohio and Iowa into play is that “the dark red parts of (them) are going to be light red, and that’s a big deal,” Giangreco says. “When you are losing counties by 50 points, instead of 60 to 70, it’s a different ballgame.”
The economy is, by far, the best lever for Democrats hoping to regain ground with blue-collar Whites and rural residents in the heartland states. In 2024, Trump posted huge margins among Whites without a four-year college degree in all these states where exit polls were conducted. But disappointment in his economic record has depressed his approval rating with them to around 50-50 in Pennsylvania and Wisconsin and the upper 50s in Ohio.
Likewise, farmers across the heartland are being squeezed between rising costs for fuel and fertilizer and disruption of export markets in the international tussling over Trump’s tariffs. One recent Iowa study calculated one-fifth of the state’s farms were “finally vulnerable,” well over double the level in 2022.
Trump’s ratings are suffering not only because voters are broadly unhappy about the economy, but because so many believe his policies have compounded their problems — with the Iran war, for instance, directly linked to rising gas prices. “This is not like people need a University of Chicago economics paper to explain why gas prices are high,” Giangreco says. Medicaid cuts in the 2025 GOP tax-and-spending bill that disproportionately stress rural hospitals add another pain point.
And while many elected officials and political strategists in both parties have long considered tariffs attractive to working-class voters, Kemp says even blue-collar White men have reluctantly turned against them because of their impact on prices. “Much as they might want manufacturing to come back to the US, what they say in focus groups is that their day-to-day lives are hurting because of it,” she says.
Against all these headwinds, Republicans are not defenseless. The One Big Beautiful Bill Act created a $50 billion fund specifically for rural hospitals. Trump wants to channel another $50 billion in federal subsidies to farms this year, a breathtaking sum that would provide roughly one-third of all income for farmers, according to a recent analysis by the Environmental Working Group, an environmental analysis and advocacy group. Usually, federal payments account for only about one-tenth of farm income, says Anne Schechinger, the group’s senior director of agriculture and climate research.
Mark Graul, a longtime GOP strategist in Wisconsin, says the key for Republicans, especially in the gubernatorial elections, will be to try to decouple from the discontent about Washington. “You have to localize the election and do your best not to allow Democrats to make this a referendum on what’s happened in Washington DC,” Graul says.
But as Graul notes, that’s not easy to do. He learned that when he ran the Wisconsin gubernatorial campaign in 2006 for GOP Rep. Mark Green, who lost amid pervasive discontent with another Republican president (George W. Bush) over another Mideast war (Iraq). “I’ve lived it,” Graul said with a sigh. “I know how hard it is.”
Still, for all the doubts polls across these states register about Trump, they also make clear that Democrats have hardly repaired their own dents, especially among the key non-college and rural constituencies. “You can talk all day about how Trump has taken some hits with some of these populations, but the only thing less popular is the Democratic Party,” says Kochel.
In many of the heartland states Democrats are contesting this year, they will still need a perfect storm to win. But it no longer seems impossible that high gas prices, depressed farm incomes, an unpopular war, an erratic president, and some strong candidate recruitment can produce exactly that.