2026-05-29T05:05:36-04:00 / 福克斯新闻
专家表示，即便达成任何协议，找到并销毁这批核材料可能仍是长期挑战
作者：摩根·菲利普斯 福克斯新闻
2026年5月29日上午5:05 EDT发布 | 2026年5月29日上午6:52 EDT更新
销毁或转移伊朗铀库存需要付出什么代价：专家解读
核专家安德里亚·斯特里克解释了为何保护伊朗的浓缩铀可能需要挖掘团队、国际核查人员和危险材料专家进入严重受损的核设施内部开展工作。
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尽管据报道美伊谈判代表正朝着临时框架协议迈进，但一个最关键的问题仍未解决：伊朗的浓缩铀库存将如何处置？
伊朗官员多次坚称，保留浓缩铀是谈判中的红线，即便唐纳德·特朗普总统曾誓言伊朗“不会拥有核武器”，并暗示必要时美国最终可以“收缴”这批材料。
防扩散专家表示，这一问题是未来任何协议能否切实阻止伊朗快速走向武器级铀浓缩的核心——尤其是在美国空袭破坏了关键核设施，但未必能清除核材料本身之后。
“我认为这会给任何协议埋下致命隐患，因为只要保留这批60%浓度的库存，或是任何低浓缩材料，”战略与国际研究中心研究员安德里亚·斯特里克在接受福克斯新闻数字频道采访时表示，“这将让伊朗能够在其选择的时机，将铀浓缩至武器级水平。”
![卫星图像显示2025年12月7日和2026年1月28日的伊朗伊斯法罕核设施，其中一栋受损建筑上方已搭建新屋顶。(Planet Labs PBC/美联社)]
空袭之后，美国将如何确保伊朗浓缩铀的安全？
在2026年“史诗之怒”行动以及2025年美国对福特奥、纳坦兹和伊斯法罕等伊朗关键核设施发动空袭后，这一问题再度引发紧迫关注。
尽管空袭可以破坏离心机、隧道系统和浓缩设施，但专家表示，找到、保护并销毁浓缩铀本身是另一项完全不同的挑战。摧毁基础设施可以减缓或中断核项目，但对核材料本身的清点需要持续的准入渠道、可靠的情报和国际监督。
“库存将是本届政府的关注重点，尤其是60%浓度的铀，”斯特里克说。
![示意图显示标注有伊朗核设施的地图，包括阿拉克重水反应堆和纳坦兹浓缩工厂。(FDD/福克斯新闻)]
据信，伊朗拥有数千公斤浓缩铀，浓度从低浓缩铀到60%不等，后者被视为接近武器级，可更快提纯至通常与核武器相关的90%浓度。
斯特里克表示，特朗普政府可能会坚持要求这批库存要么在伊朗境内销毁，要么在国际监督下转移出伊朗。
“最佳方案是在伊朗境内销毁这批库存，这样就不必纠结由谁接收，也不必担心按照特定条款运回库存后伊朗会如何处置，”她说。
前中央司令部司令警告不要采取“高风险”美军地面行动夺取伊朗浓缩铀
但即便伊朗同意交出或销毁这批铀，执行此类行动可能仍需要挖掘团队、国际核核查人员和危险材料专家在严重受损的地下设施内开展工作。
任何实际收缴或转移铀的行动，都可能引发更广泛的疑问：最终需要美国或国际在地面投入多少直接参与——尽管本届政府面临政治压力，避免在伊朗陷入长期军事承诺。
“你得进入严重受损的场地，甚至不确定这批材料的状态如何，”斯特里克说。
专家评估“掩体炸弹”的打击效果
斯特里克表示，伊斯法罕地下隧道设施遭到了战斧导弹打击，而纳坦兹和福特奥基地则遭到了专为摧毁地下核设施设计的巨型钻地弹袭击。
“因此你需要危险材料处理团队来安全封装这批材料，要么就地销毁，要么安全转移出伊朗，”她说。
斯特里克指出，这种形态的浓缩铀具有化学毒性和腐蚀性，但她表示，其不会带来与核爆炸相关的那种大规模放射性危险。
“没人愿意吸入这种材料，或是让皮肤直接接触它，”她说。
另一种可能的途径是将这批材料移交国际监管。
斯特里克表示，国际原子能机构（IAEA）和国际回收团队可以监督铀的转移，并将其运往该机构设在哈萨克斯坦的低浓缩铀燃料银行。
她还表示，有限数量的浓缩铀最终也可以转化为民用核反应堆的燃料棒，但她认为伊朗不应保留对这批材料的直接控制权。
军备控制协会防扩散政策主任凯尔西·达文波特此前曾告诉福克斯新闻数字频道，在受损设施内尝试收缴或销毁材料，不如通过国际监督下的稀释浓缩来得更实际。
“国际原子能机构仍是重返伊朗、监督场地、追查并清点浓缩铀的最佳渠道，”达文波特说。
目前无法立即联系到白宫置评。特朗普周日在真相社交平台上写道：“这批浓缩铀（核粉尘！）要么立即移交给美国……要么最好……就地销毁。”
![这张由伊朗国际摄影机构（IIPA）提供的资料图片显示，2010年8月21日，俄罗斯援建的伊朗南部布什尔核电站装载首批燃料时的反应堆大楼景象。(IIPA via 盖蒂图片社)]
不过，伊朗官员仍坚持称，该国有权将铀浓缩和库存作为民用核计划的一部分。
伊朗议会国家安全委员会主席易卜拉欣·阿齐兹周三表示，保留浓缩铀库存仍是伊朗与美国谈判中的一条“红线”。
这一立场最终可能与许多防扩散倡导者视为任何协议核心目标的原则发生冲突：阻止伊朗保留快速核突破能力。
斯特里克表示，在国际核查渠道受限之前，核查人员对这批材料的数量和位置已有相对清晰的了解，但她认为，未来任何协议都需要对铀的处理和转移进行持续的国际监督。
斯特里克指出，任何长期协议可能不仅需要转移库存，还需要严格限制伊朗未来的铀浓缩能力，并扩大国际核查人员的准入范围。
“理想情况下应该是永久禁令，”她在谈到铀浓缩时说，“但看起来他们更倾向于长期暂停。”
她补充道，任何协议还需要国际原子能机构重新深入伊朗设施，包括军事基地，以核实合规情况并清点核材料。
“他们需要全面的准入权限，想去哪里就去哪里，包括军事基地，以排除伊朗的任何作弊行为，”斯特里克说。
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就目前而言，谈判代表似乎正朝着临时框架协议迈进，同时更广泛的核谈判仍在继续。但专家表示，伊朗浓缩铀的处置问题最终可能成为任何协议的决定性议题。
即便外交取得进展，找到、保护并永久销毁这批材料，可能仍会在协议签署后长期成为一项挑战。
Trump nuclear talks face defining question: What happens to Iran’s uranium stockpile?
2026-05-29T05:05:36-04:00 / Fox News
Experts say physically locating and neutralizing the material may remain a challenge long after any agreement is signed
By Morgan Phillips Fox News
Published May 29, 2026 5:05am EDT | Updated May 29, 2026 6:52am EDT
What it would take to destroy or remove Iran’s uranium stockpile: expert
Nuclear expert Andrea Stricker explains why securing Iran’s enriched uranium could require excavation teams, international inspectors and hazardous materials specialists operating inside heavily damaged nuclear facilities.
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Even as U.S. and Iranian negotiators reportedly move toward a temporary framework agreement, one of the most consequential questions remains unresolved: What happens to Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile?
Iranian officials repeatedly have insisted retaining enriched uranium is a red line in negotiations, even as President Donald Trump has vowed Iran “will not have a nuclear weapon” and suggested the United States could ultimately “take” the material if necessary.
Nonproliferation experts say the issue sits at the center of whether any future agreement can credibly prevent Iran from rapidly moving toward weapons-grade enrichment — particularly after U.S. strikes damaged key nuclear facilities but did not necessarily eliminate the nuclear material itself.
“I think it would put a poison pill in any agreement because retaining any of these 60% stockpile or really any of the lower enriched material,” Andrea Stricker, a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, told Fox News Digital. “That would give them the ability to go higher to weapons grade at a time of their choosing.”
Satellite images show Iran’s Isfahan nuclear facility on Dec. 7, 2025, and on Jan. 28, 2026, after a new roof was built over one of the damaged buildings.(Planet Labs PBC/AP)
AFTER THE STRIKES, HOW WOULD THE US SECURE IRAN’S ENRICHED URANIUM?
The issue has taken on renewed urgency following 2026’s Operation Epic Fury against Iran and 2025 U.S. strikes on key Iranian nuclear facilities, including Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan.
While airstrikes can damage centrifuges, tunnel systems and enrichment infrastructure, experts say physically locating, securing and neutralizing enriched uranium presents a separate challenge altogether. Destroying infrastructure can slow or disrupt a nuclear program, but accounting for nuclear material itself requires sustained access, reliable intelligence and international oversight.
“The stockpile is going to be the focus for the administration because that is the material, in particular the 60%,” Stricker said.
An illustration shows a map pinpointing Iran’s nuclear facilities, including the Arak heavy water reactor and the Natanz enrichment plant.(FDD/Fox News)
Iran is believed to possess thousands of kilograms of enriched uranium ranging from low-enriched material to uranium enriched to 60%, which is considered near weapons-grade and can be more quickly refined to the 90% level typically associated with nuclear weapons.
Stricker said the Trump administration is likely to insist the stockpiles either be destroyed inside Iran or removed from the country under international supervision.
“The best option would be to destroy the stockpile in Iran, and then you’re not having to deal with who takes possession and what can Iran do with the stockpile as far as having it sent back under certain terms,” she said.
EX-CENTCOM COMMANDER WARNS AGAINST ‘RISKY’ US GROUND OPERATION TO SEIZE IRAN’S ENRICHED URANIUM
But even if Iran agreed to surrender or neutralize the uranium, carrying out such an operation would likely involve excavation teams, international nuclear inspectors and hazardous materials specialists working inside heavily damaged underground facilities.
Any operation to physically secure or remove the uranium could also raise broader questions about how much direct U.S. or international involvement would ultimately be required on the ground, even as the administration faces political pressure to avoid a prolonged military commitment in Iran.
“You’re talking about having to go down into heavily damaged sites and you’re not sure what the state of the material even is,” Stricker said.
Experts gauge success of ‘bunker buster’ bombs
Strickler said the underground Isfahan tunnel facility was struck with Tomahawk missiles, while Natanz and Fordow sites were hit with massive ordnance penetrators designed to reach buried nuclear infrastructure.
“So you will need hazard material teams to handle it, to safely package it and either to have it destroyed or to remove it from the country safely,” she said.
Stricker noted that enriched uranium in this form is chemically toxic and corrosive, though she said it would not pose the kind of large-scale radiological danger associated with a nuclear detonation.
“People don’t want to be breathing that material or coming into contact with it with their skin,” she said.
Another possible pathway would involve transferring the material to international custody.
Stricker said the International Atomic Energy Agency, along with an international recovery team, could potentially oversee the removal of the uranium and transfer it to the agency’s low-enriched uranium fuel bank in Kazakhstan.
Limited quantities could also eventually be converted into fuel rods for civilian nuclear reactors, she said, though she argued Iran should not retain direct access to the material itself.
Kelsey Davenport, director for nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association, previously told Fox News Digital that internationally monitored downblending may ultimately prove more practical than attempting to physically seize or destroy the material inside damaged facilities.
“The IAEA remains the best place to go back into Iran to monitor the sites, to try to track down and account for the enriched uranium,” Davenport said.
The White House could not immediately be reached for comment. “The Enriched Uranium (Nuclear Dust!) will either be immediately turned over to the United States … or, preferably … destroyed in place,” Trump wrote on Truth Social Sunday.
This handout image supplied by the IIPA (Iran International Photo Agency) shows a view of the reactor building at the Russian-built Bushehr nuclear power plant as the first fuel is loaded, on August 21, 2010 in Bushehr, southern Iran.(Photo by IIPA via Getty Images)
Iranian officials, however, have continued to insist the country has a right to maintain uranium enrichment and stockpiles as part of a civilian nuclear program.
Ebrahim Azizi, head of the Iranian parliament’s national security committee, said Wednesday that maintaining enriched uranium stockpiles remains one of Iran’s “red lines” in negotiations with the United States.
That position may ultimately collide with what many nonproliferation advocates view as the core objective of any agreement: preventing Iran from preserving a rapid nuclear breakout capability.
Stricker said international inspectors had a relatively strong understanding of the quantities and locations of the material before access became more restricted, but argued that any future agreement would require continuous international monitoring over how the uranium is handled and removed.
Stricker argued that any long-term deal would likely require not only removal of the stockpile, but also strict limits on Iran’s future enrichment capabilities and expanded access for international inspectors.
“Ideally it would be a permanent ban,” she said, referring to uranium enrichment. “But it appears that they’re leaning more towards a long moratorium.”
She added that any agreement would also require the International Atomic Energy Agency to regain deep access to Iranian facilities, including military sites, to verify compliance and account for nuclear materials.
“They need full access to go wherever they would like, including to military sites to rule out any Iranian cheating,” Stricker said.
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For now, negotiators appear to be moving toward a temporary framework agreement while broader nuclear talks continue. But experts say the question of what happens to Iran’s enriched uranium may ultimately become the defining issue of any deal.
Even if diplomacy advances, physically locating, securing and permanently neutralizing the material could remain a challenge long after any agreement is signed.