2026-07-14T14:43:51.809Z / https://www.cnn.com/2026/07/14/politics/iran-us-return-military-strikes-mcgurk-analysis
布雷特·麦古克是CNN全球事务分析师，曾在乔治·W·布什、巴拉克·奥巴马、唐纳德·特朗普和乔·拜登任内担任高级国家安全职位。
美以针对伊朗的军事行动于今年2月启动时，我援引了经典军事理论中的一项原则：如果一位领导人——在此次事件中即唐纳德·特朗普总统——在发动军事行动前并未明确心中想要达成的目标，那么这些目标将由他人代为定义，且未必符合他的预期。
这番话出自19世纪理论家卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨，鉴于中东当前局势，他恐怕要在墓中辗转难安了。
近五个月前对伊朗发动袭击时，以色列和美国都未明确界定具体作战目标。特朗普曾提及政权更迭、削弱伊朗军事能力，以及销毁他去年夏天下令空袭后残留的伊朗核材料。伊朗的回应是袭击中东多国境内目标，以及在霍尔木兹海峡通行的商船——这条航道承担着全球20%的能源贸易运输量。
如今，美国的主要目标是开放霍尔木兹海峡，而正如克劳塞维茨可能早已警示的那样，开战之初，这个目标甚至从未被纳入考量范围。
美国与伊朗即将走完特朗普与伊朗总统马苏德·佩泽希齐扬签署的60天谅解备忘录的一半时长（30天）。该文件据称以豁免部分制裁作为让步，换取霍尔木兹海峡商船的安全通行。但根据条款，伊朗似乎有权定义此期间海峡内的通行安排。
德黑兰正从字面意义解读该文件，而美国则援引了文件文本之外的附带谅解协议。
上周，伊朗无人机袭击了两艘商船：一艘是卡塔尔籍液化天然气运输船，另一艘是沙特籍原油运输船。据报道，伊朗通过中间人传话称此次袭击是误判。甚至有观点认为，这反映了德黑兰内部的权力斗争：一方希望维持谅解备忘录，另一方则准备冒险与美国进一步升级冲突。
特朗普随即下令实施报复性空袭，以维护美国对谅解备忘录的解读。此前伊朗已发动多起商船袭击事件，而本周，这份谅解备忘录彻底破裂。周一，特朗普宣布重新对伊朗港口实施封锁，并表示美国准备成为海峡的“守护者”，以换取某种形式的回报。美国随后又在伊朗境内发动新一轮空袭，伊朗则袭击了阿联酋近海的另外两艘商船，造成一名印度船员死亡。
在局势稳定下来之前，几乎没有商船愿意冒险通过霍尔木兹海峡，这将导致油价再次小幅上涨。这可能会加大白宫重启谅解备忘录谈判的压力。
如此一来，美国和伊朗又退回到了谅解备忘录签署前的原状。
伊朗似乎在盘算，通过对海峡施加压力，将迫使美国彻底放弃，从而在中东地区形成新的格局，让德黑兰实际掌控这一全球咽喉要道。美国则押注，对伊朗施加新的压力将迫使伊朗让步，恢复战争爆发前商船不间断通行的局面。
在这场博弈中，伊朗拥有两大优势，一个是古老的优势，另一个是现代的优势。其古老优势源自地形的天然力量——这往往是防御方最宝贵的资源。伊朗正利用其地理位置，迫使美国陷入不对称对抗，抵消华盛顿的硬实力优势。其现代优势则是无人机作战，尤其是伊朗生产的“沙希德”系列无人机，这种无人机制造成本低廉，航程超过1000英里，可在夜间袭击慢速行驶的油轮。无人机可以被击落或偏转，但只要一次袭击——甚至只是袭击威胁——就能阻止商业通航。
这两大优势——古老与现代结合——至少在短期内对伊朗有利。这也意味着，如果美国真想确保商船安全通行，可选择的选项寥寥无几。2023年至2024年，我作为白宫中东事务负责人，当时伊朗代理组织胡塞武装依靠无人机和反舰导弹 effectively shut down the Red Sea。尽管组建了国际联盟并针对胡塞武装发动了长期空袭，但我们几乎无法拦截每一次发射，更不用说让航运公司重拾信心、愿意冒险通航了。
但从长期来看，优势可能会向华盛顿倾斜，原因有四：
- 首先，海湾国家一致反对伊朗对海峡的主权主张，且日益与美国合作，确保冲突不会以伊朗掌控航道告终。
- 其次，伊朗经济仍处于困境，长期封锁将进一步向其决策者和要求变革的伊朗民众施压。
- 第三，伊朗的防空系统仍较为松散，美国军事力量可随时发动打击，唯一的限制是已知目标的数量。
- 最后，随着时间推移，多元化出口航线建设取得进展，全球对海峡的依赖程度降低。阿联酋本周宣布了绕过海峡的新港口和基础设施计划，该计划基于已在推进的项目。削弱伊朗通过海峡挟持全球经济的能力，将减少其主要的谈判筹码。
美国能否持续实施长期的军事和经济施压，最终将取决于每周通过霍尔木兹海峡的石油及其他产品（如化肥和液化天然气）的全球价格。在签署谅解备忘录前不久，特朗普曾表示不想成为赫伯特·胡佛，见证一场新的大萧条，这承认了伊朗通过海峡施加的压力已经奏效。自谅解备忘录签署以来，能源价格大幅下跌，但如今又再度上涨，周一涨幅近10%。
那么接下来会发生什么？
我预计今夏将充斥着针锋相对的军事袭击、秘密外交渠道、时而缓和的紧张局势，以及随后再度爆发的冲突。毕竟，几十年来伊朗的行事模式一直如此——尤其是针对美军在伊拉克、叙利亚或其他地区的袭击。华盛顿曾动用军事力量威慑此类袭击，通过外交手段加以遏制，并在必要时双管齐下降级局势。只要伊朗革命卫队仍掌控德黑兰政权，外交充其量只能达成有限的战术协议。
如今，同样的模式正在霍尔木兹海峡上演，只是波及范围更广。
局势也可能进一步恶化。胡塞武装仍有能力封锁红海，且周一与沙特阿拉伯交火，试探阿拉伯半岛脆弱的停火协议。若红海和霍尔木兹海峡同时失守，将进一步给宏观经济带来压力，并向华盛顿施压。与此同时，伊朗有能力且愿意在两个国际咽喉要道用无人机和导弹袭击民用船只，这凸显了伊朗政权的本质问题。该国多年来一直在为这些局面做准备，其新领导人相信美国最终会妥协。
迄今为止，特朗普已经证明这种预测是错误的。
Operation Boomerang: A return to military strikes reveals no good options — for Iran or the US
2026-07-14T14:43:51.809Z / https://www.cnn.com/2026/07/14/politics/iran-us-return-military-strikes-mcgurk-analysis
Brett McGurk is a CNN global affairs analyst who served in senior national security positions under Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump and Joe Biden.
When the US and Israeli military operation against Iran began in February, I cited a principle classical military theory. If a leader — in this case, President Donald Trump — is not clear in his own mind regarding the objectives to be achieved before launching a military operation, the objectives will be defined for him and not in ways he may have anticipated.
That’s from Carl von Clausewitz, the 19th century theorist who may well be rolling over in his grave given the events unfolding in the Middle East.
Neither Israel nor the US defined with specificity the objectives to be achieved when the attack on Iran launched nearly five months ago. Trump spoke of regime change, as well as degrading Iran’s military capabilities and removing its remaining nuclear material left over from airstrikes he had ordered last summer. Iran responded by attacking countries across the Middle East — and commercial ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz, the channel accounting for 20% of global energy trade.
Today, the main objective for the US is to open the strait, an objective that — as Clausewitz might have warned — was not even on the table when the war began.
The US and Iran are about to reach the halfway mark (30 days) of a 60-day memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed by Trump and Iran’s president, Masoud Pezeshkian. That document purported to grant concessions to Iran in the form of sanctions relief in return for safe passage for commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz. By its terms, however, the document appears to grant Iran the right to define the arrangements to be used in the Strait during this period.
Tehran is reading the document literally, whereas the US has pointed to side understandings that reach behind the text.
Last week, Iranian drones targeted two ships — one from Qatar carrying liquid natural gas, and another from Saudi Arabia, carrying crude oil. Reportedly, Iran passed messages through intermediaries that the strikes were a mistake. Some even claimed they reflected an internal power struggle within Tehran between those aiming to keep the MOU intact and those prepared to risk a further escalation with the United States.
Trump quickly ordered retaliatory airstrikes to enforce the American understanding of the MOU, which followed more Iranian attacks on ships — and then, this week, the MOU unraveled altogether. On Monday, Trump announced that he was reimposing a blockade on Iranian ports and said the US was prepared to become the “guardian” of the strait in exchange for payment in some form. The United States launched another round of airstrikes inside Iran, and Iran targeted two more commercial ships off the coast of UAE, killing an Indian crew member.
Until this all settles down, few ships may risk passing through the Strait of Hormuz, causing oil prices to creep upward once again. That could increase pressure on the White House to take another go at the MOU.
So, the US and Iran have crept back to the exact situation that existed before the MOU was signed in the first place.
Iran appears to be calculating that its pressure on the strait will force the US to give up altogether, thereby ceding a new equation in the Middle East with Tehran effectively in charge of a global chokepoint. The US appears to be betting that new pressure on Iran will force it to relent and permit the uninterrupted flow of commerce that existed before the war started.
In that equation, Iran has two advantages, one ancient and one modern. Its ancient advantage is the natural power of terrain — often the best resource for a defender. Iran is using its geographic location to force the US into an asymmetrical contest and neutralizing Washington’s hard power advantages. Its modern advantage is drone warfare, in particular Iran’s Shahed drones that are cheap to produce and can travel over 1,000 miles to strike a slow-moving oil tanker in the dark of night. Drones can be shot down and deflected but it only takes one strike — or even the threat of a strike — to stop commercial traffic.
Together, these two advantages — ancient and modern — favor Iran, at least in the short term. They also present the US with limited options if it aims to truly guarantee the safe passage of commercial ships. I was the White House lead on the Middle East in 2023 and 2024 when an Iranian proxy group, the Houthis, effectively shut down the Red Sea with drones and anti-ship missiles. Despite forming an international coalition and launching a prolonged air campaign against the Houthis, it was nearly impossible for us to stop every launch let alone restore confidence to shipping companies to risk the journey.
Longer term, however, the advantages may shift in Washington’s favor — for four reasons.
- First, the Gulf states are united in rejecting Iran’s claims to the strait and they are increasingly cooperating with the US on ensuring this conflict does not end with Iran in control of the passageway.
- Second, Iran’s economy remains in distress and a prolonged blockade will compound pressure on its decision-makers, as well as on the Iranian people demanding change.
- Third, Iran’s skies remain loosely defended and US military forces can strike at will with the only limit being the number of known targets.
- Finally, with each passing week, there is progress on diversified export routes thereby reducing global dependency on the strait. The UAE this week announced new plans for ports and infrastructure to bypass the strait, building on projects already underway. Reducing Iran’s ability to hold the global economy hostage through the strait would reduce its main source of leverage.
Whether the US can sustain a prolonged campaign of military and economic pressure will depend ultimately on the global price of oil and other products that pass through the Strait of Hormuz — such as fertilizer and liquid natural gas — on a weekly basis. Shortly before signing the MOU, Trump said he did not want to be Herbert Hoover and oversee a new Great Depression, an acknowledgement that Iran’s pressure through the strait had worked. Since the MOU was signed, energy prices have fallen significantly but they’re on the rise again, jumping nearly 10% on Monday.
So what happens now?
I anticipate a hot summer of tit-for-tat military strikes, open back channels for diplomacy, reduced tension at times, and then new flare-ups at others. After all, this has been the pattern with Iran for many decades — particularly with attacks against US troops in Iraq, Syria, or elsewhere. Washington has utilized military force to deter such attacks, diplomacy to contain them, and a combination of both to de-escalate when necessary. So long as Iran’s Revolutionary Guards remain in charge in Tehran, diplomacy offers at best narrow and tactical deals.
That same pattern is now playing out in the Strait of Hormuz, albeit with far broader implications.
The situation could also turn worse. The Houthis maintain capacity to shut down the Red Sea, and on Monday traded fire with Saudi Arabia — testing a fragile ceasefire on the Arabian peninsula. Loss of the Red Sea and Strait of Hormuz would further stress the macro economy — and put pressure on Washington. At the same time, Iran’s capacity and willingness to target civilian ships with drones and missiles in two international chokepoints highlights the underlying nature of the problem with Iran’s regime. It’s been preparing for these scenarios for years and its new leaders believe the United States will ultimately back down.
Thus far, Trump has proven that prediction to be wrong.
