2026-09-21T04:00:29.323Z / https://www.cnn.com/2026/09/21/politics/nato-prepares-russia-widen-ukraine-war-mcgurk
布雷特·麦古克是CNN全球事务分析师，曾在乔治·W·布什、巴拉克·奥巴马、唐纳德·特朗普和乔·拜登任内担任高级国家安全职位。
有一件事正让欧洲人心惶惶。
本周，俄罗斯最亲密的军事盟友白俄罗斯在苏瓦乌基走廊附近开展大规模军演。这条狭长走廊是连接波罗的海国家与北约其他成员国的唯一通道，长期以来一直是北约最脆弱的战略要点之一。
法国总统埃马纽埃尔·马克龙召集法国政治领导人举行机密情报简报会，随后宣布推出新措施，保护关键基础设施免受俄罗斯日益加剧的混合攻击。
波兰总理唐纳德·图斯克则发出更为严厉的警告，称俄罗斯可能会以伪装成意外事故的方式，对北约国家发动无人机或导弹袭击。
英国已告知国民开始为战争可能性做准备，并储备罐装食品和饮用水。英国国防参谋长表示，英国正面临数十年来“最危险”的时期。
德国正在为俄罗斯可能发动的袭击做医院准备。德国总理弗里德里希·默茨警告称，欧洲大陆“捍卫自由与和平正处于关键时刻”。
就连向来奉行中立的瑞士也通过了新的国家安全战略，呼吁提升国家韧性，并增强抵御武装攻击的能力。
与此同时，美国总统唐纳德·特朗普突然宣布，在波兰建立永久性美军基地的工作取得进展。两周前，他派遣中央情报局局长执行秘密任务，警告莫斯科不要攻击北约领土。
大西洋两岸的国家似乎都感到警觉，担心俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京可能很快会将其战争范围扩大到乌克兰之外。
本周，美国见识了这种威胁。
联邦检察官指控五人涉嫌为俄罗斯情报机构效力，参与一个在全球范围内策划袭击和谋杀的网络，其中包括在美国境内的行动。检察官还指控该网络针对欧洲国家的民用和军事基础设施发动袭击。
这些指控符合欧洲多年来面临的更广泛模式：网络攻击、破坏活动、纵火、无人机袭击以及针对关键基础设施的袭击。上个月，德国指责俄罗斯对一处民用机场发动无人机袭击。
北约面临的战略挑战在于，俄罗斯可以在不明确越过常规战争红线的情况下开展此类行动。
驾驶无人机进入北约领空、扰乱机场运行、破坏基础设施、通过犯罪网络实施谋杀——所有这些都是可否认的“灰色地带”行动。
普京将模糊性和否认作为武器，试探北约的决心，同时他也清楚，北约内部在如何最好地应对这些行动，甚至是否应该应对这些行动上存在分歧。
但如果普京决定采取更进一步的行动呢？
苏瓦乌基走廊就是一个答案。
这条走廊长约65英里，位于波兰和立陶宛之间，是北约波罗的海成员国——立陶宛、拉脱维亚和爱沙尼亚与北约其他地区之间唯一的陆路连接通道。
想象一下这样一场危机：俄罗斯可能与白俄罗斯协同行动，将部队开进走廊的一部分。这并非明确入侵北约成员国，比如坦克开进波兰境内。如果普京有所表态，他会声称这只是有限的入侵，并称俄罗斯并不寻求升级局势。
俄罗斯还会通过非官方渠道宣称，北约的任何回应都有可能引发核战争。
此举的目的与其说是为了占领走廊、切断北约的波罗的海侧翼，不如说是为了彻底破坏北约及其共同防御承诺。
32个北约成员国是否会同意为收复一小片领土而与俄罗斯开战？美国总统是否会为了立陶宛这个国家，而冒险与一个核大国升级冲突？德国和法国会这么做吗？
没人能给出确切答案，而这正中普京下怀。
今年，北约秘书长马克·吕特被问及一场恰好涉及俄罗斯入侵苏瓦乌基走廊的军事演习时，他回应称，北约会定期针对此类情况开展演习，任何攻击都将遭到毁灭性反击。
普京会相信他的话吗？鉴于华盛顿与其包括加拿大在内的最亲密盟友之间关系紧张——恐怕未必。
乌克兰为欧洲上了一堂残酷的现代战争必修课。
各国需要的不仅仅是军事装备。它们需要能够抵御攻击的电网、能够应对大规模伤亡的医院、冗余的通信系统、运转正常的交通网络，以及能够在持续压力下正常运作的政府。
最重要的是，它们需要社会能够承受代价，而不陷入崩溃或两极分化。
本周，北约公开发布了更新后的国家韧性要求，涵盖“危机与冲突”期间从政府连续性、能源供应到食品、水、医疗保健和通信等方方面面。
北约官员正在研究乌克兰人如何在俄罗斯持续攻击下维持基本服务运转。
这是一个非同寻常的转变。乌克兰不再仅仅从北约汲取经验教训——北约也正在从乌克兰汲取经验教训。
通过这样做，该联盟的目标不仅是通过承诺对侵略行为进行毁灭性反击来威慑对手，更是要向普京证明，他的侵略行径不会得逞。
备战本身就成为威慑的一部分。这也是本周大量相关头条新闻出现的原因之一。
欧洲的紧迫感背后还有一个美国因素。
美国同时在欧洲部署兵力、在中东与伊朗对峙、在印太地区威慑中国。防空系统、海军部队、情报平台以及日益耗尽的弹药无法同时部署到所有地区。
特朗普为加强北约做出了诸多努力，但他对北约共同防御条款的承诺却不明朗。
莫斯科清楚这一点。
俄罗斯仍深陷乌克兰战场。但普京不需要再发动一场像乌克兰战争那样大规模的入侵来挑战北约。他可以逐步升级冲突等级：破坏活动、网络攻击、暗杀阴谋、无人机或导弹袭击，然后再发动一场有限的军事行动，试探北约是否仍坚守其承诺。
扪心自问，特朗普会为了一片名为苏瓦乌基走廊的土地与俄罗斯开战吗？美国人会准备好应对这样的局面吗？答案不言自明。
而仅此一点就削弱了威慑力。
冷战结束后的三十年间，欧洲放任国家备战能力萎缩。战争风险似乎遥不可及。军事开支和征兵人数大幅下降。民防已成为过去的遗迹。而且人们认为，在紧急情况下美国会出手相助。
那个时代已经结束。
欧洲正在为战争做准备，因为其领导人越来越清楚一个令人不安的事实：威慑力取决于普京的想法，而美国对一场扩大化战争的回应将是不确定的。
白俄罗斯在苏瓦乌基走廊附近的军演敲响了警钟，因为尽管俄罗斯在乌克兰陷入困境，但威慑平衡已经恶化。
防止战争扩大的最佳方式，就是确保普京相信他的图谋将会失败。
而从欧洲各国首都目前正在采取的紧急行动来看，越来越多人担心，普京可能恰恰认为他的图谋会得逞。
Beyond Ukraine: Why Europe is preparing for a wider conflict
2026-09-21T04:00:29.323Z / https://www.cnn.com/2026/09/21/politics/nato-prepares-russia-widen-ukraine-war-mcgurk
Brett McGurk is a CNN global affairs analyst who served in senior national security positions under Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump and Joe Biden.
Something is spooking Europe.
This week, Belarus, Russia’s closest military ally, conducted large exercises near the Suwałki Gap, the narrow corridor connecting the Baltic states to the rest of NATO. The geography that has long made it one of NATO’s most vulnerable points.
French President Emmanuel Macron summoned France’s political leaders for a confidential intelligence briefing, then announced new measures to protect critical infrastructure from intensifying Russian hybrid attacks.
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk went further, warning that Russia may launch drone or missile attacks against NATO countries and disguise them as accidents.
The UK has told citizens to start preparing for the possibility of war, and to stockpile canned foods and drinking water. Its chief of defense said Britain faced the “most dangerous” period in decades.
Germany is preparing its hospitals for a possible Russian attack. Its Chancellor, Friredrich Merz, warned of “decisive moments” in “defending the freedom and peace of our continent.”
Even the famously neutral Switzerland adopted a new national security strategy calling for greater resilience and an ability to defend itself against an armed attack.
President Donald Trump, meanwhile, suddenly announced progress toward establishing a permanent US Army base in Poland. Two weeks ago, he dispatched the CIA Director on a secret mission to warn Moscow against attacking NATO territory.
Countries on both sides of the Atlantic seem alarmed that Russian President Vladimir Putin might soon widen his war beyond Ukraine.
The United States got a glimpse of the threat this week.
Federal prosecutors charged five people allegedly working with Russian intelligence in a network plotting attacks and murders around the world, including inside the US. Prosecutors also allege the network commissioned attacks against civilian and military infrastructure in European countries.
The charges fit a broader pattern Europeans have confronted for years: cyberattacks, sabotage, arson, drones and attacks against critical infrastructure. Last month, Germany blamed Russia for a drone attack at a civilian airport.
The strategic challenge for NATO is that Russia can conduct such operations without clearly crossing the threshold into conventional war.
Fly a drone into NATO airspace, disrupt an airport, sabotage infrastructure, conduct murders through criminal networks — all deniable “gray zone” operations.
Putin uses ambiguity and denial as a weapon, testing NATO resolve, while recognizing that NATO is divided on how best to respond, or to respond at all.
But what if Putin decides to go further?
The Suwałki Gap offers one answer.
It is a roughly 65-mile border between Poland and Lithuania and the only land connection between NATO’s Baltic states—Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia—and the rest of NATO.
Imagine a crisis in which Russia, perhaps operating with Belarus, moves forces into a portion of the corridor. It’s not an explicit invasion of a NATO state, such as tanks rolling into Poland. Putin would claim a limited incursion if he said anything at all, and that Russia did not seek escalation.
Russia would also claim through non-official channels that a NATO response risked nuclear war.
The purpose is less about the Gap and severing NATO’s Baltic flank, than undermining NATO and its mutual defense commitments altogether.
Would 32 NATO countries agree to fight Russia to recover a small strip of territory? Would an American president risk escalation with a nuclear power over Lithuania? Would Germany and France?
Nobody can say for certain, and that plays into Putin’s hands.
NATO’s Secretary General Mark Rutte was asked this year about a war game involving precisely such a Russian move against the Suwałki corridor. His response was that NATO regularly exercises against such scenarios and that an attack would produce a devastating response.
Does Putin believe him? With Washington at loggerheads with its closest allies, including Canada — perhaps not.
Ukraine has provided Europeans with a brutal tutorial in what modern war requires.
Countries need more than military materiel. They need electrical grids that can survive attacks, hospitals capable of handling mass casualties, redundant communications, functioning transportation networks and governments able to operate under sustained pressure.
Most importantly, they need societies capable of absorbing costs without collapsing or polarizing.
This week, NATO publicly released updated requirements for national resilience, covering everything from continuity of government and energy supplies to food, water, health care and communications during “crisis and conflict.”
NATO officials are studying how Ukrainians have kept essential services functioning under sustained Russian attack.
It’s an extraordinary turn of events. Ukraine is no longer simply receiving lessons from NATO — NATO is also receiving lessons from Ukraine.
In doing so, the alliance aims to deter not just by promising a devastating response to aggression — but by demonstrating to Putin that his aggression won’t work.
Preparedness itself becomes part of deterrence. That is one reason for the slew of headlines this week.
There is also an American factor behind Europe’s urgency.
The US is simultaneously deployed in Europe, fighting Iran in the Middle East and deterring China in the Indo-Pacific. Air defenses, naval forces, intelligence platforms, and depleting munitions cannot be everywhere at once.
Trump has done much to strengthen NATO, but his commitment to its mutual defense clause is uncertain.
Moscow knows this.
Russia remains bogged down in Ukraine. But Putin does not need another invasion on the scale of Ukraine to challenge NATO. He can move up an escalation ladder: sabotage, cyberattacks, assassination plots, drone or missile attacks — and then a limited military operation designed to test whether NATO still means what it says.
Ask yourself whether Trump would go to war with Russia over a patch of land called the Suwalki Gap? Would Americans be ready for such a thing? The question answers itself.
And that alone undermines deterrence.
For three decades after the Cold War, Europe allowed national preparedness to atrophy. Risks of war seemed remote. Spending on militaries and recruitment plummeted. Civil defense was a relic of the past. And the US was presumed to be there in a pinch.
That era is over.
Europe is preparing for war because its leaders increasingly understand an uncomfortable truth: deterrence depends on what Putin believes, and America’s response to a widening war would be uncertain.
The Belarusian exercises near the Suwalki gap are raising alarms because, despite Russia’s struggles in Ukraine, the deterrence equation has atrophied.
The best way to prevent a widening war is to make certain Putin believes it will fail.
And judging by the urgent moves now underway across European capitals, there is growing concern that he may believe the opposite.
