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更新于：2026年9月11日 / 美国东部时间晚上7:52 / 哥伦比亚广播公司新闻
华盛顿讯——美国中央情报局（CIA）于周五解密了2001年“9·11”恐怖袭击发生前数月乃至数年的71份情报报告，首次公开了该间谍机构在袭击发生前向两位总统通报的有关“基地”组织与奥萨马·本·拉登的情报详情。
这批解密文件包括为《总统每日简报》（PDB）准备的评估报告，该简报会提交给总统及高级政府官员。此次解密恰逢袭击事件25周年纪念活动，其中包含70份2001年袭击前的文件以及1份袭击次日的报告。其中两份文件曾在国会设立的“9·11委员会”开展调查期间对外公开。
中央情报局局长约翰·拉特克利夫表示，此次解密是“有史以来规模最大的一次‘9·11’事件相关中情局分析报告公开行动”。
“25年前，‘9·11’袭击给我们国家造成重创，但并未将我们击垮。此后，一代又一代中情局官员投身于为遇难美国人伸张正义、确保‘基地’组织不再危害我国的事业中。”拉特克利夫在一份声明中说道。
新增解密“9·11”文件披露了哪些内容？
CNN / 盖蒂图片社
新增解密文件显示，在“9·11”事件发生前数年，中情局对本·拉登及其追随者袭击美国的决心已有多深程度的了解。这些评估报告被纳入向比尔·克林顿总统与乔治·W·布什总统提交的《总统每日简报》。周五解密的几乎所有文件都包含涂黑删减内容。
最早的一份文件日期为1998年2月13日，文件称本·拉登与其他伊斯兰极端分子“会面【内容被删减】并同意从公开市场采购未指明种类的化学、生物及核材料”。报告指出，本·拉登“拥有合法企业、商业关系和一个金融帝国，可助力其获取”上述武器。
本·拉登及其武装人员在阿富汗境内活动，受到塔利班保护。多份文件描述了塔利班庇护本·拉登的动机，并详细说明了本·拉登在阿富汗毒品贸易中日益扩大的影响力。1999年10月的一份报告称，本·拉登“对与塔利班领导人穆拉·奥马尔相关的57个毒品实验室进行了巨额投资”，并招募专家“研发更易成瘾的毒品——可能是摇头丸或甲基苯丙胺”。（“9·11委员会”后续调查发现“没有可靠证据表明本·拉登参与毒品贩运或通过贩毒牟利”。）
1998年2月的另一份报告称，本·拉登等人发布了一份宗教法令“呼吁所有穆斯林袭击全球范围内的美国利益及平民，直至美国‘撤离’沙特阿拉伯和‘巴勒斯坦’”。
1998年9月10日的一份备忘录警告称，极端分子“可能将满载炸药的飞机撞向美国城市”，但同时附带免责声明称，现有情报“未提供有关本·拉登未来袭击意图的确切信息”。该报告提到，本·拉登“曾表示他更倾向于在美国本土华盛顿发动袭击”。
中央情报局
“9·11委员会”的最终报告中似乎提及了这份备忘录，并认定反恐中心未后续“分析被劫持或满载炸药的飞机如何可被用作武器”。委员会发现，如果当时进行了此类分析，“将很快发现恐怖分子面临的关键制约因素——找到能够驾驶大型喷气式客机的自杀式袭击者”。
2001年夏季的多份报告详细描述了有关美国境内可能发生袭击的模糊情报。时任中情局局长乔治·特尼特曾向“9·11委员会”表示，当时“系统已亮起红灯”。2001年7月24日的一份备忘录称：“【内容被删减】显示，一场预计即将发生的、由本·拉登赞助的恐怖袭击行动已被推迟，但其他近期袭击的筹备工作可能仍在进行中。”
周五的解密行动包含了那份臭名昭著的、标题为“本·拉登决意袭击美国”的2001年8月备忘录，该备忘录曾应“9·11委员会”要求于2004年解密。备忘录称，联邦调查局的情报“显示美国境内存在可疑活动模式，与劫持飞机或其他类型袭击的筹备工作相符，包括近期对纽约联邦大楼的监视”。
“9·11委员会”在其报告中指出，这份8月备忘录“是当年截至目前简报的第36项与本·拉登或‘基地’组织相关的《总统每日简报》内容，也是首次专门探讨美国境内发生袭击可能性的简报”。周五的解密文件包含18份布什政府时期袭击发生前的简报内容，这意味着袭击发生前的部分《总统每日简报》材料仍处于保密状态。
一位前高级情报官员表示，早至1996年甚至更早的多份预警恐怖威胁的《总统每日简报》内容未被纳入此次解密行动，2001年的部分其他文件也未公开。
“9·11委员会”发现，“2001年夏季，大多数情报界人士都意识到威胁报告的数量和严重程度前所未有。许多官员告诉我们，他们知道某个可怕的袭击计划正在酝酿之中，他们不顾一切地想要阻止它。”
中情局周五解密的最后一份文件日期为2001年9月12日，即恐怖分子劫持飞机撞击世贸中心、五角大楼并在宾夕法尼亚州野外坠毁的次日。这份“情况报告”描述了袭击发生前后围绕本·拉登的最新情报，包括其可能参与袭击的细节。
“越来越多的证据表明，阿富汗和波斯湾地区的逊尼派极端分子近期已知晓乌萨马·本·拉登指挥的袭击即将发生。”报告称。“【内容被删减】一场可能发生的袭击行动在阿富汗极端分子中广为人知，且有推测称本·拉登可能已迁至喀布尔，以避免与坎大哈的塔利班领导层就其活动发生冲突。”
该备忘录称，本·拉登与塔利班领导人奥马尔在2001年8月“就本·拉登发动恐怖袭击的决心发生争执”。
“本·拉登告诉穆拉·奥马尔，他正在筹备会对美国造成重大破坏的行动。”备忘录说道。
报告还称，“一名驻扎在坎大哈的阿拉伯人昨日表示，此次袭击是两年筹备的结果，是‘愤怒的开端’，【内容被删减】暗示国会大厦和白宫也可能成为此次袭击的目标。”
“9·11委员会”的报告认定，“想象力、政策、能力和管理方面的失误”导致政府未能在袭击发生前阻止“9·11”事件，而“最关键的失误在于想象力的缺失”。
CIA declassifies dozens of never-before-seen intelligence reports related to 9/11
2026-09-11T16:02:00-0400 / CBS News
By Stefan Becket Managing Editor, Digital Politics
Stefan Becket is a managing editor of politics for CBSNews.com. Stefan has covered national politics for more than a decade and helps oversee a team covering the White House, Congress, the Supreme Court, immigration and federal law enforcement.
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Olivia Gazis
Olivia Gazis covers intelligence and international security matters for CBS News. Twice Emmy-nominated, she has traveled worldwide with the secretary of state and contributes reporting on intelligence, foreign policy and other security topics across CBS News broadcast, radio, online and streaming platforms.
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Updated on: September 11, 2026 / 7:52 PM EDT / CBS News
Washington — The CIA on Friday released 71 intelligence reports from the months and years leading up to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, providing a new look at what the spy agency told two presidents about al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden before the deadly strikes.
The trove of documents includes assessments prepared by analysts for the President’s Daily Brief, which is distributed to the president and senior administration officials. The release, which coincided with ceremonies marking 25 years since the attacks, includes 70 documents from before the 2001 attacks and one report from the day after. Two of the documents had previously been made public during the course of the investigation by the 9/11 Commission, the body established by Congress to examine the attacks.
CIA Director John Ratcliffe said the disclosure was “the single largest release of CIA analysis related to 9/11 ever.”
“25 years ago, the 9/11 attacks struck a blow to our Nation, but they did not break us. Generations of CIA officers have since dedicated their careers to securing justice for our fallen Americans and ensuring al-Qa’ida would never again harm our country,” Ratcliffe said in a statement.
What’s in the new 9/11 documents?
Osama bin Laden in an interview with CNN from a cave hideout somewhere in Afghanistan on Aug. 20, 1998. CNN / Getty Images
The new documents show the extent to which the CIA was aware of bin Laden and his followers’ determination to strike the U.S. in the years leading up to 9/11. The assessments were included in the PDB given to Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. Nearly all the documents released Friday include redactions.
The earliest document was dated Feb. 13, 1998. It said that bin Laden and other Islamic extremists “met [redacted] and agreed to procure unspecified chemical, biological, and nuclear substances from open markets.” The report said that bin Laden “has legitimate companies, business relationships, and a financial empire that could assist his pursuit of” the weapons.
Bin Laden and his fighters were based in Afghanistan, under the protection of the Taliban. Several of the documents describe the Taliban’s motivations in harboring bin Laden, and detail bin Laden’s growing role in Afghanistan’s drug trade. An October 1999 report said he had “made a substantial investment in 57 narcotics laboratories associated with” Mullah Omar, the head of the Taliban, and had recruited experts “to develop more addictive drugs — possibly ecstasy or methamphetamine.” (The 9/11 Commission later found “no reliable evidence that Bin Ladin was involved in or made his money through drug trafficking.”)
Another report from February 1998 said that bin Laden and others had issued a fatwa “calling for all Muslims to attack US interests and civilians worldwide until the US ‘retreats’ from Saudi Arabia and ‘Palestine.’”
A Sept. 10, 1998, memo warned that extremists “may fly an explosive-packed airplane into a US city,” while including the disclaimer that the available intelligence “provides no conclusive information on Bin Ladin’s intentions for future attacks.” The report noted that bin Laden “said his preferred option is to strike the US on its own soil in Washington.”
An excerpt from the September 1998 memo. CIA
The 9/11 Commission’s final report included an apparent reference to that memo, and determined that the Counterterrorist Center did not subsequently “analyze how an aircraft, hijacked or explosives-laden, might be used as a weapon.” If it had, the commission found, it “would soon have spotlighted a critical constraint for the terrorists — finding a suicide operative able to fly large jet aircraft.”
Reports from the summer of 2001 detail murky intelligence about a potential plot to strike inside the U.S. At that point, the “system was blinking red,” as then-CIA Director George Tenet told the 9/11 Commission. One memo from July 24 said that “[redacted] indicates that an expected imminent Bin Ladin-sponsored terrorist operation has been postponed, but preparations for other near-term attacks may still be in train.”
Friday’s release included the infamous memo titled “Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US” from August 2001, which was declassified in 2004 at the request of the 9/11 Commission. The memo said that FBI information “indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York.”
In its report, the 9/11 Commission said the August memo “was the 36th PDB item briefed so far that year that related to Bin Ladin or al Qaeda, and the first devoted to the possibility of an attack in the United States.” Friday’s release includes 18 items dated from the Bush administration before the attacks, meaning at least some of the PDB material from the lead-up remains secret.
A former senior intelligence official said numerous PDB items warning about the threat as far back 1996 and even earlier were not included in Friday’s disclosure, nor were a number of additional pieces from 2001.
The 9/11 Commission found that “[m]ost of the intelligence community recognized in the summer of 2001 that the number and severity of threat reports were unprecedented. Many officials told us that they knew something terrible was planned, and they were desperate to stop it.”
The final document included in the CIA’s release on Friday is dated Sept. 12, 2001, the day after planes smashed into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and a field in Pennsylvania. The “situation report” described the latest intelligence surrounding bin Laden in the run-up to the attack, including details about his likely involvement.
“Mounting evidence indicates Sunni extremists in Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf recently were aware Usama Bin Ladin-directed attacks were imminent,” the report said. “[Redacted] the existence of a probable operation was widely known among extremists in Afghanistan and speculated Bin Ladin may have relocated to Kabul to avoid conflict over his activities with the Taliban leadership in Kandahar.”
The memo said that bin Laden and the Taliban’s Omar “clashed over Bin Ladin’s determination to mount terrorist attacks” in August 2001.
“Bin Ladin told Mullah Omar he had operations in progress that would cause great damage to the US,” the memo said.
The report also said that “[a] Kandahar-based Arab yesterday said the attacks were the result of two years’ planning and were ‘the beginning of the wrath,’ [redacted] suggest the Capitol and the White House also may have been targets of the operations.”
The 9/11 Commission report determined that “failures of imagination, policy, capabilities, and management” contributed to the government’s inability to stop the 9/11 attacks before they happened, and that “the most important failure was one of imagination.”