2026-09-15T04:01:29.352Z / https://www.cnn.com/2026/09/15/politics/mcgurk-houthis-bab-al-mandeb-critical-waterway
布雷特·麦古克是CNN全球事务分析师，曾在乔治·W·布什、巴拉克·奥巴马、唐纳德·特朗普和乔·拜登四位总统任内担任高级国家安全职位。
曼德海峡是分隔阿拉伯半岛与非洲的狭长水道。从北侧，它连接红海与亚丁湾和印度洋；从南侧，则可通过苏伊士运河进入地中海。
在当前战乱爆发前，这条航道承载了全球约30%的集装箱运输量。
汽车、家具、食品、能源——所有这些货物都要通过这条最窄处仅约20英里的航道。一旦这条航道无法使用，往返亚洲与欧洲的船只必须绕行非洲南部的好望角，额外增加数千英里航程、数日航行时间，并推高商品价格。
眼下的伊朗冲突将全球的注意力聚焦于霍尔木兹海峡以及世界对其能源运输的依赖。伊朗曾袭击霍尔木兹海峡内的船只，以此向华盛顿施压，要求美国停止战争并寻求和谈。伊朗多年前就在曼德海峡锤炼过这一战术，而就在上周，其在也门的盟友武装发动新攻势后，伊朗有望故技重施。
曼德海峡的字面意思是“哭泣之门”。有传说将这一名称归因于将非洲与阿拉伯半岛分开的古代地震和洪水，造成了无数人丧生。无论其确切起源如何，这条海峡向来与灾祸脱不了干系。
我近期在拜登政府任职期间，亲身了解了这一切。
自1979年以来，伊朗革命政府一直寻求在中东扩张其意识形态与影响力，主要通过伊斯兰革命卫队及其精锐的圣城军——字面意义上的“耶路撒冷部队”——来训练和装备该地区的武装团体。
黎巴嫩真主党。加沙的哈马斯与巴勒斯坦伊斯兰圣战组织。多次袭击美军、以色列和沙特阿拉伯的伊拉克民兵。还有日渐壮大的也门胡塞武装。
其战略直白明了：在孱弱或分裂的国家建立武装网络，让德黑兰获得战略纵深与杠杆，而无需亲自直接参战。
美国、以色列以及以美国为核心的地区伙伴关系，尤其是与沙特阿拉伯的合作，长期以来都是主要目标。
“美国去死，以色列去死，诅咒犹太人。”
也门位于沙特阿拉伯正南方，冷战期间分为南北两部分，直到1990年才实现统一。但统一从未完全解决深层的政治、部落和地区分歧。
胡塞运动于20世纪80年代末90年代在也门北部从宰德派什叶派复兴运动中兴起。在侯赛因·胡塞的领导下，该运动转向政治与武装对抗，与也门中央政府多次爆发战争。
该组织后来采用了“安萨尔安拉”（即“支持真主”）的名称，并带有伊朗风格的官方口号，毫不隐晦：
“真主至大。美国去死。以色列去死。诅咒犹太人。伊斯兰必胜。”
2014年，胡塞武装占领也门首都萨那，将政府赶至南部，最终引发了沙特领导的军事干预。
也门近海小岛成为伊朗战争中的战略战利品
https://www.cnn.com/
伊朗并非胡塞武装的创始人，该组织仍保有自身的利益与野心。但伊朗的武器、导弹部件、无人机、训练和技术专长，帮助当地叛乱分子升级为具备全球影响力的武装力量。
就在乔·拜登就职前不久，在我被任命为中东事务协调员之后，也门已是亟待解决的首要议题。
我接到了参议员、人道主义组织和活动人士的来电，敦促我们尽一切努力结束战争。
这场内战已进入第七个年头，人道主义局势极其糟糕，尤其是在胡塞武装控制的地区——他们将资源投入战争，同时依靠国际组织维持其控制区内平民的生计。
唐纳德·特朗普总统曾将胡塞武装列为外国恐怖组织。救援组织警告称，这一认定会让救援行动陷入法律风险，可能加剧人道主义危机，而沙特阿拉伯对胡塞武装控制的萨那及其他地区的空袭更是让危机雪上加霜。
作为回应，拜登政府撤销了这一认定，终止美国对沙特进攻性行动的支持——包括部分武器销售——并任命了一名特别特使，以寻求停火与政治解决方案。
大致在同一时期，美国军方撤出了在中东的部分军事资产，将防空系统撤离沙特，将驱逐舰和航母战斗群调出中东地区。华盛顿的重心转向外交，但缺乏外交成功通常所需的硬实力支撑。
在美国撤军之际，伊朗加大了介入力度。
它通过海上和陆上走私路线向胡塞武装提供援助。伊朗和真主党人员还协助组装和制造精密武器，与此同时胡塞武装对沙特阿拉伯的袭击也愈演愈烈。
2022年4月，在美国的斡旋下达成了停火协议，这一定程度上得益于拜登总统当年夏天对沙特阿拉伯的访问。人们曾希望这次停火能为更持久的政治解决方案开辟空间。
但回过头来看，这次停火实则让胡塞武装占据了优势。伊朗继续训练和装备其代理人武装，以服务于更广泛的地区战略。
2023年，在哈马斯10月7日的大屠杀以及以色列对加沙的报复行动之后不久，伊朗的武装盟友从多个方向加入了冲突。
真主党从黎巴嫩开火，而伊朗支持的伊拉克和叙利亚民兵则袭击美军，最终造成美军人员阵亡。
从也门方向，胡塞武装向以色列发射弹道导弹和无人机，并袭击红海和曼德海峡内的商业船只。他们声称此举是为了向以色列施压，要求其停止在加沙的行动，但实际上袭击的船只与这场冲突毫无关联，目的是扰乱这条重要的商业航道。
2024年1月10日，我在阿曼与伊朗官员秘密会晤，以遏制地区局势升级。
就在前一晚，胡塞武装对红海的商业船只和以美国为首的海军发动了迄今为止规模最大的袭击，使用了无人机、反舰巡航导弹和弹道导弹。这是自第二次世界大战以来美国海军遭遇的最大规模袭击。
所幸凭借船员的娴熟操作和先进的导弹防御系统，没有人员伤亡。
伊朗的意图毫不隐晦：它将通过袭击我们来支撑其地区野心和外交行动，同时否认直接责任。
在阿曼的会晤以失败告终。
次日晚间，拜登总统下令对胡塞武装的军事目标实施首次大规模美军打击，英国、澳大利亚、巴林、加拿大和荷兰提供了支持。这场行动以各种形式持续了一年多。
华盛顿付出了惨痛代价才意识到，也门表面上的平静掩盖了一场重要的战略转变。
在内战基本停火的数年里，伊朗帮助打造了一支武装力量，不仅能够威胁沙特阿拉伯或在也门国内打内战，还能攻击以色列，并在其选择的任何时候通过封锁曼德海峡，挟持全球商业。
去年，特朗普政府恢复了对胡塞武装的恐怖组织认定，并升级了美国对该组织的打击行动。在七周的美军空袭后，阿曼促成了一项谅解协议：美国将停止轰炸胡塞武装目标，胡塞武装将停止袭击美国船只。
该协议未涵盖以色列或沙特阿拉伯，但似乎带来了一段时期的平静。维持了一段时间。
随后，上周局势再次生变。
胡塞武装沿也门红海海岸发动快速攻势，夺取了直接俯瞰曼德海峡的新阵地。随后，据报道他们占领了迈云岛——又称皮林岛——这座岛屿位于海峡正中央。CNN记者尼克·罗伯逊刚走访过该地区，并报道了其易受攻击的状况。
如今，胡塞武装的常规武器——火炮和火箭弹——能够袭击船只，而不仅仅是依靠远程无人机和导弹。
目前，船只仍在通过曼德海峡。特朗普曾表示，胡塞武装声称不想与我们对抗，会放行船只。
但胡塞武装不必明天就封锁这条海峡。他们挟持这条航道的能力，为德黑兰增添了又一个谈判筹码。
这会成为新的常态吗？
未必。也门的前线时常变动。有报道称，政府军正准备发动反攻，华盛顿可能会提供情报支持。美国中央司令部司令布拉德·库珀上将刚访问沙特阿拉伯，以评估局势。
但无论接下来发生什么，胡塞武装都再次向世界证明，在伊朗的直接支持下，他们仍是任何地区权力与影响力竞争中的一张王牌变数。
而华盛顿永远不应再将平静误判为和平。
Yemen’s Gate of Tears: How another critical waterway became Iran’s wild card
2026-09-15T04:01:29.352Z / https://www.cnn.com/2026/09/15/politics/mcgurk-houthis-bab-al-mandeb-critical-waterway
Brett McGurk is a CNN global affairs analyst who served in senior national security positions under Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump and Joe Biden.
The Bab al-Mandeb Strait is a narrow passage of water separating the Arabian Peninsula from Africa. From the north, it connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. From the south, it provides access through the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean.
Before the current wars, this passage carried about 30% of global container traffic.
Cars, furniture, food, energy — all moving through a passage only about 20 miles wide at its narrowest point. Without it, ships traveling between Asia and Europe must go around southern Africa and the Cape of Good Hope, adding thousands of miles, days of travel and higher prices for goods.
The ongoing conflict with Iran has focused attention on the Strait of Hormuz and the world’s dependency on its energy traffic. Iran has attacked ships in Hormuz to increase pressure on Washington to stop the war and sue for peace. It’s a tactic that Iran honed years ago in the Bab al-Mandeb — and is positioned to repeat after a new offensive by its aligned militant force in Yemen just last week.
Bab al-Mandeb translates literally as the “Gate of Tears.” Some legends attribute the name to ancient earthquakes and floods that separated Africa from Arabia, killing untold thousands. Whatever the precise origin, it’s not known for much good.
I recently learned all this firsthand while working in the Biden administration.
Since 1979, Iran’s revolutionary government has sought to expand its ideology and influence across the Middle East, principally through its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its elite Quds Force — literally, Jerusalem Force — which trains and equips armed groups across the region.
Hezbollah in Lebanon. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza. Militias in Iraq that have repeatedly attacked American forces, Israel and Saudi Arabia. And increasingly, the Houthis in Yemen.
The strategy is straightforward: Build armed networks in weak or fractured states, giving Tehran strategic depth and leverage without having to fight directly itself.
The United States, Israel and US-anchored regional partnerships, particularly with Saudi Arabia, have long been central targets.
“Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse the Jews.”
Yemen, directly south of Saudi Arabia, was divided between North and South during the Cold War, and unified only in 1990. But unification never fully resolved deep political, tribal and regional divisions.
The Houthi movement emerged in northern Yemen in the late 1980s and 1990s from a Zaydi Shiite revival movement. Under Hussein al-Houthi, it became political and militant, fighting repeated wars against Yemen’s central government.
The group later adopted the name Ansar Allah with an Iranian-inspired official slogan was anything but subtle:
“God is great. Death to America. Death to Israel. Curse the Jews. Victory to Islam.”
In 2014, the Houthis seized Yemen’s capital, Sana’a, driving the government south and eventually prompting a Saudi-led military intervention.
Small island off Yemen becomes strategic prize in Iran war
https://www.cnn.com/
Iran did not create the Houthis, who retain their own interests and ambitions. But Iranian weapons, missile components, drones, training and technical expertise helped turn a local insurgency into a globally relevant force.
Shortly before Joe Biden entered office, after I had been named his Middle East coordinator, Yemen was a front-burner issue.
I received calls from senators, humanitarian organizations and activists urging us to do whatever it took to stop the war.
The civil war was entering its seventh year, and the humanitarian situation was horrific, particularly in areas controlled by the Houthis, who poured resources into the war while relying on international organizations to sustain civilians under their control.
President Donald Trump had designated the Houthis a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Aid groups warned this put relief operations in legal jeopardy and might worsen the humanitarian crisis, which was exacerbated by Saudi airstrikes against the Houthis in Sanaa and other areas they controlled.
In response, the Biden administration revoked the designation, ended US support for Saudi offensive operations — including certain arms sales — and appointed a special envoy to pursue a ceasefire and political settlement.
At roughly the same time, the US military withdrew regional assets, moving air defenses out of Saudi Arabia and destroyers and carrier strike groups out of the Middle East. Washington’s focus turned towards diplomacy but without the hard power backing that’s often necessary for diplomacy to succeed.
As the US pulled back, Iran doubled down.
It supplied the Houthis through maritime and overland smuggling routes. Iranian and Hezbollah personnel also helped assemble and manufacture sophisticated weapons, as Houthi attacks into Saudi Arabia intensified.
In April 2022, the United States helped broker a truce, enabled partly by President Biden’s visit to Saudi Arabia that summer. There was hope the truce might open space for a more permanent political settlement.
In retrospect, however, the truce shifted advantage toward the Houthis. Iran continued training and equipping its proxy for use in a broader regional strategy.
In 2023, shortly after Hamas’s October 7 massacres and Israel’s response in Gaza, Iran’s armed partners joined the conflict from multiple directions.
Hezbollah fired from Lebanon, while Iran-backed militias in Iraq and Syria attacked American forces, eventually killing Americans.
From Yemen, the Houthis fired ballistic missiles and drones toward Israel and attacked commercial shipping in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb. Claiming to pressure Israel over Gaza, they instead attacked ships having nothing to do with the conflict with an aim to disrupt a major commercial corridor.
On January 10, 2024, I met Iranian officials secretly in Oman to contain the regional escalation.
The night before, the Houthis launched their largest attack yet against commercial ships and US-led naval forces in the Red Sea, using drones, anti-ship cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. It was the biggest attack against the US Navy since World War II.
There were no casualties solely on account of the skill of our sailors and advanced missile defenses.
Iran’s point was not subtle. It would back its regional ambitions and diplomacy with attacks against us while denying direct responsibility.
The meeting in Oman failed.
The following night, President Biden ordered the first major US strikes on Houthi military targets, with support from the UK, Australia, Bahrain, Canada and the Netherlands. The campaign continued in various forms for more than a year.
Washington had learned the hard way that the quiet in Yemen had concealed an important strategic shift.
During the years in which the civil war largely stopped, Iran had helped create an armed force capable not simply of threatening Saudi Arabia or fighting a civil war inside Yemen, but of reaching Israel and holding global commerce hostage whenever it chose to do so by shutting down the Bab al-Mandeb.
Last year, President Trump restored the terrorist designation of the Houthis, and escalated US attacks against the group. After seven weeks of American strikes, Oman brokered an understanding: The United States would stop bombing Houthi targets and the Houthis would stop attacking US vessels.
The agreement did not cover Israel or Saudi Arabia, but it appeared to impose some quiet. For a time.
Then, last week, the map changed again.
In a rapid offensive down Yemen’s Red Sea coast, Houthi forces seized new ground directly overlooking the Bab al-Mandeb. Then, they reportedly crossed onto Mayyun Island — also known as Perim — which sits in the middle of the strait. CNN’s Nic Robertson had just visited the area and reported on its vulnerability.
Now, Houthi conventional weapons — artillery and rockets — can strike at ships, not just longer-range drones and missiles.
For now, ships are still passing through Bab al-Mandeb. Trump has said the Houthis claim not to want a confrontation with us and will let ships through.
The Houthis do not have to close the strait tomorrow, however. Their ability to hold the passage hostage provides Tehran an added piece of leverage.
Is this the new status quo?
Not necessarily. The front lines in Yemen often shift. There are reports that government forces are preparing a counterattack and that Washington may provide intelligence information. CENTCOM commander Adm. Brad Cooper was just in Saudi Arabia to review the situation.
Whatever happens next, however, the Houthis have reminded the world once again that they are positioned to remain — with Iran’s direct backing — a wildcard in any regional competition for power and influence.
And Washington should never again mistake quiet for peace.
