2026-08-20T09:00:30.085Z / https://www.cnn.com/2026/08/20/politics/independents-democrats-red-states-senate
2026年参议院席位争夺战出现了一些耐人寻味的变数：在爱达荷州、内布拉斯加州和南达科他州这三个州，民主党人已经退出竞选，转而帮助一名独立候选人在红州争取胜选。
不过近年来，这种策略已经在多场参议院选举中被尝试过，但至少在联邦层面，至今尚未真正奏效。
那么……今年这招能成吗？
可能性依然不大。但历史经验表明，持续尝试仍是值得的。至少这能让民主党在那些民主党候选人几乎没有胜算的州，多一分阻止共和党拿下席位的机会。
事实上，每当这种策略被付诸实施时，共和党在这些州的参议院选举表现都会成为近年以来最差的几次之一。
近年来这类策略的典型案例包括：2014年堪萨斯州的格雷格·奥尔曼、2022年犹他州的埃文·麦克马林，以及2024年内布拉斯加州的丹·奥斯本。
奥斯本是一名海军退伍军人兼工会组织者，他将在2026年再次参选。爱达荷州的候选人是前州众议员托德·阿喀琉斯，南达科他州的候选人则是退役空军中校布莱恩·本格斯——他此前曾以民主党人的身份竞选参议员。
两年前的奥斯本竞选，可以说是迄今为止这类策略在参议院选举中最成功的一次尝试。
尽管他最终落败，但他将共和党现任参议员黛比·费舍尔的得票率压制到了53%，远低于同一天选票上唐纳德·特朗普总统获得的59%。奥斯本仅以7个百分点的差距惜败，这也比民主党总统候选人卡玛拉·哈里斯21个百分点的惨败要接近得多。
费舍尔的得票表现也是内布拉斯加州20年来共和党参议员候选人最差的一次——上一次共和党参议员候选人表现更差还要追溯到民主党参议员本·纳尔逊上次赢得该州席位的20年前。
同样，2022年的麦克马林在一个民主党在两次总统选举中均以20多个百分点劣势落败的州，仅以10个百分点之差惜败。
在犹他州，这是共和党参议院候选人近50年来（自1976年以来）的最差表现。和内布拉斯加州一样，上一次共和党参议员候选人表现比这次还差，还要追溯到该州还有民主党参议员的年代。
至于2014年堪萨斯州的奥尔曼，他的表现或许没有那么具有历史标志性，但考虑到当年整体有利于共和党的选举环境，其整体表现依然亮眼。
奥尔曼以11个百分点的差距落败，这一差距与1996年以及2020年民主党在堪萨斯州的失利幅度相当。但他是在共和党大举斩获席位的年份做到这一点的——当年参议院共和党事实上净增了9个席位。
因此，尽管当年整体有利于共和党，但内布拉斯加州出现了共和党近20年来最差的参议院选举表现，犹他州出现了近50年来最差的表现，堪萨斯州则出现了近30年来最差的表现之一。
这些都不算独立候选人的胜选，但绝对称不上是糟糕的回报。
2020年阿拉斯加州也曾出现过类似情况：独立候选人阿尔·格罗斯尽管并未登记为民主党人，但赢得了民主党提名，并以民主党候选人身份参选。他最终以近13个百分点的差距落败，结果并不算出人意料。
不过，阿拉斯加州提供了这类策略最近一次带来胜选的案例——只不过是在州长选举中。2014年，独立候选人比尔·沃克在民主党候选人退出并成为其竞选搭档后，以2个百分点的优势当选州长。
但或许州长选举能成功，而参议院选举不能，是有充分理由的。历史数据显示，参议院选举的党派极化程度往往更高。选民更倾向于将候选人视为某一政党的代表，跨党派投票的情况并不多见。
这或许也能解释这类选举中一个常见现象：独立候选人的民调支持率往往最终都会高于实际得票率。在奥尔曼、格罗斯和麦克马林的案例中，选举日前曾有不少人认为他们有望真正胜选。但随后——或许因为保守派选民意识到这会分流共和党选票——他们最终以更大的差距落败。
话虽如此，即便这种策略似乎会分流共和党选票，也不代表2026年在爱达荷州、内布拉斯加州和南达科他州就不会分流共和党选票。尤其是爱达荷州和南达科他州，即便在最理想的情况下，恐怕也因过于深红而难以奏效。
但也有必要指出，真正尝试过这类策略的年份：2014年、2022年和2024年。事实上，这些年份没有一个是真正有利于民主党的。2022年的选举是最接近的一次，整体局势也算势均力敌。
对民主党人来说，乐观的看法是：这类策略过去已经取得了一定效果，如今民主党占尽天时地利，效果或许会更好。
至少，这值得一试。
The Democrats’ one neat trick to try to win a Senate majority
2026-08-20T09:00:30.085Z / https://www.cnn.com/2026/08/20/politics/independents-democrats-red-states-senate
The battle for the Senate in 2026 comes with some fascinating wrinkles: In a trio of races — Idaho, Nebraska and South Dakota — the Democrat has dropped out to help an independent try to win in a red state.
But this strategy has already been attempted in a handful of Senate races in recent years, and it has yet to actually work — at least at the federal level.
So … could it this year?
It remains unlikely. But history suggests it’s worth it to keep trying. It at least gives Democrats a better shot of depriving Republicans of seats in states where a Democratic nominee probably wouldn’t have a chance at winning.
In fact, when this setup has been tried, Republicans have had some of their worst Senate results in recent history in those states.
The big examples of this strategy in recent years have been the independent candidacies of Kansas’ Greg Orman in 2014, Utah’s Evan McMullin in 2022 and Nebraska’s Dan Osborn in 2024.
Osborn, a Navy veteran and union organizer, is trying again in 2026. He’s joined in Idaho by Todd Achilles, a former state House member, and in South Dakota by Brian Bengs, a retired Air Force lieutenant colonel who previously ran for Senate as a Democrat.
Osborn’s race two years ago was arguably the most successful use of this strategy to date in a Senate race.
While he lost, he held GOP Sen. Deb Fischer to a considerably lower share of the vote (53%) than President Donald Trump took on the same ballot (59%). Osborn’s 7-point loss was also significantly closer than Democratic presidential nominee Kamala Harris’ 21-point loss.
Fischer’s performance was also the worst for a Republican in Nebraska since Democratic Sen. Ben Nelson last won the state 20 years ago.
Likewise, McMullin in 2022 came within 10 points in a state Democrats have lost by 20-plus points in each of the two presidential elections.
In Utah, it was the worst performance for a Republican Senate candidate in the last 50 years — since 1976. As in Nebraska, you have to go back to a time when the state had a Democratic senator to find a worse performance for the GOP.
As for Kansas’ Orman in 2014, his performance might have been less historically impressive. But it was still impressive overall given the pro-GOP environment that year.
Orman’s 11-point loss was similar to the margins Democrats lost by in 1996 and would go on to lose by in 2020 in Kansas. But he did it in a year in which the Republican Party was gaining seats — a whopping nine of them in the Senate, in fact.
So we’ve got the worst GOP performance in the last 20 years in Nebraska, in the last 50 years in Utah, and one of the worst ones in the last 30 years in Kansas — despite it being a very good GOP year.
Those aren’t wins for the independents, but they certainly aren’t bad returns.
There was a somewhat similar situation in Alaska in 2020, when independent Al Gross won the Democratic nomination despite not being a registered Democrat. But he appeared on the ballot as the Democratic nominee. His nearly 13-point loss was somewhat unremarkable.
Alaska does, though, provide the most recent example of this kind of strategy resulting in a win — in a governor’s race, at least. Independent Bill Walker was elected by 2 points in 2014 after the Democratic nominee dropped out and became his running mate.
But there’s perhaps a good reason that happened in a governor’s race and not a Senate race. History shows Senate races tend to be more polarized. People view the candidates more as votes for one party or the other, and crossover votes aren’t as plentiful.
That also might explain a phenomenon that’s become common in these races — that these independents tend to poll better than they ultimately perform. In the cases of Orman, Gross and McMullin, there was some thought heading into Election Day that they might actually win. But then — perhaps because conservative voters realized this would cost Republicans votes — they lost by wider margins.
All that being said, just because this setup seems to cost the GOP votes doesn’t mean it might cost them in Idaho, Nebraska and South Dakota in 2026. Idaho and South Dakota, in particular, might just be too red for it to work even in the best circumstances.
But it’s also worth pointing out something about the years in which this was truly tried: 2014, 2022 and 2024. In fact, none of them were truly good years for Democrats. The 2022 election was the closest, and it was a pretty evenly split one.
For Democrats, the optimistic case is that this has worked somewhat in the past, and it might work more now that they have the wind at their backs.
And at the very least, it’s worth a shot.
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