2026-11-02T16:50:05.203Z
民调可信吗?这取决于你希望它们实现什么作用。
即便最严谨开展的民调,也只是公众意见的不精确快照,而非精密仪器——当被当作预测工具使用时,它们并非总能给出正确结果。不过,虽然民调无法明确回答胶着选情中谁处于领先位置,但往往能清晰呈现重要的政治全貌。
部分选情轮廓足够鲜明,即便存在民调误差的潜在影响,依然清晰可辨。多项民调均显示,唐纳德·特朗普总统的全国支持率处于中等偏低的30%区间。民调还显示出一种广泛共识:受生活成本问题困扰的美国民众,大多对经济及特朗普的经济治理持负面看法;任何群体对国家现状都缺乏热情;选民普遍渴望变革——即便他们对变革的具体方向未必达成一致。
同样,民主党在全国“通用选票”中的领先优势一直稳定且显著,足以表明该党整体占据优势;要抵消这一优势,需要出现规模空前的民调误差。但关于这一优势的具体程度,以及这种优势将在个别选举中如何体现,仍存在较大不确定性。与民调所显示的民主党支持强度相比,哪怕只是微小差距,都可能意味着将出现大幅席卷共和党地盘的“蓝色浪潮”,或是不足以打破对共和党更为有利的参议院选举格局。
今年民调人员面临的挑战之一,是存在一项看起来既是选情决定性因素、又可能成为民调误差潜在来源的发现:两党选民投票热情的巨大差距。
民调与提前投票数据一致,发现与共和党相比,民主党选民今年投票的积极性要高得多。这既影响民调人员获取受访对象的工作,也影响他们试图确定哪些潜在选民最终会在本次选举中实际投票。
据盖洛普公司的数据,民主党的热情优势是1994年以来所有中期选举中最大的。部分原因在于,尤其是在第二个任期,特朗普激起的反对热情远高于其获得的支持热情。这也源于美国政治中日益扩大的教育鸿沟:拥有大学学历的选民比没有大学学历的选民更可能在中期选举中 turnout,且如果他们去投票,更可能投给民主党。
但这种热情差距也可能影响选民对民调作出回应的意愿。
例如,在《华盛顿邮报》与舒尔学校合作开展的堪萨斯州民调中,接受访员联系的登记选民中,民主党人完成调查的可能性远高于共和党人。尽管这种差距在本次选举周期中并非普遍存在,但《纽约时报》与锡耶纳学院合作开展的最终一批民调也出现了类似的回应模式。
这种有时被称为“差异无应答”的情况,对民调人员而言并非全新的挑战。一直以来,某些人群比其他人更可能回应调查,包括老年人、教育程度较高者和公民参与度更高者。民调人员通过对结果进行加权处理,使样本人口统计特征更接近他们试图测量的更广泛人群,来解决这种差距。如今,越来越多的做法还包括按已知的党派目标进行加权,比如某个州的党员登记水平或2024年的投票选择。
令民调人员担忧的是,即使在对人口统计特征和党派目标进行加权后,仍有部分模式未得到充分修正。一项民调可能拥有反映选民结构的“正确”共和党人与民主党人数量,却未能覆盖每个政党内部的恰当选民组合。
并非每一位登记选民都会在每次选举中实际投票——在大多数年份,40%或更多登记选民会缺席投票——这也会让民调人员的工作变得复杂。为了反映那些最终实际投票者的观点,民调人员会确定“可能选民”,而这些工作会因同样难以联系到热情较低的潜在选民等因素而变得复杂。
有可能出现这种情况:部分共和党人可能因过于疏离而不愿回应调查,却仍然足够热情并最终投票;或是最积极热情的民主党人在调查中被过度代表。
即使民调能够准确反映开展调查时的动态,若共和党选民在选举后期围绕候选人集结,仍可能在民调结束后出现选情变化。
例如,CNN的各州最终民调,给选民提供了一个选项,可表示不会支持即将到来的参议院选举中的任何一位候选人——即便在被问及倾向哪一方的后续问题后,每项民调中仍有6%至8%的受访者表示,在两位领先候选人之间,他们会选择“不支持任何一方”或其他人。民调还要求选民选择他们更希望哪个政党掌控参议院,即便他们最初表示这对自己无关紧要。将这两个问题的答案结合来看,我们发现,在大多数这类民调中,支持共和党掌控参议院的选民,比希望民主党获胜的选民更可能选择不支持主要政党候选人——在得克萨斯州这一差距约为9个百分点,在堪萨斯州为6个百分点,在密歇根州为4个百分点。
这很可能反映了选举日的实际情况。得克萨斯州和堪萨斯州的共和党提名人肯·帕克斯顿与罗杰·马歇尔,都面临着特定的形象问题,导致他们难以巩固本党的支持,而倾向共和党的选民在这些州完全可能最终选择不参与这场选举。但这也表明,民主党尚未彻底锁定胜局。在一系列相对胶着的选举中,这可能足以大幅缩小胜选差距,或彻底改变部分选举的结果。
另一方面,民调误差未必一定对民主党有利。过去三个周期的总统选举民调都低估了共和党相对于民主党的得票率:2016年和2024年约低估3个百分点,2020年接近5个百分点。
但在特朗普执政时期的中期选举中,并未出现类似模式。民调误差也未必会在所有涉及的州呈现相同形态。
正如我们在2024年所写,民调数据是衡量人们观点的单一、不完善的指标。但归根结底,美国民调是与涵盖广泛人口统计特征、生活经历和观点的美国民众交流的方式,涉及的话题远远超出选举,甚至远超政治范畴。在一个深度分裂的社会中,而社交媒体往往反映的是最响亮声音的非代表性样本,民调仍然是理解整个国家的宝贵工具。
What polls do and don’t tell us about the 2026 midterms
2026-11-02T16:50:05.203Z
Can the polls be trusted? It depends on what you’re trusting them to do.
Even the most carefully conducted polls are imprecise snapshots of public opinion, not precision instruments — and when they’re pressed into predictive tools, they don’t always get it right. But while surveys can’t provide an unambiguous answer on who’s ahead in tight races, they often do paint a clear and important picture of the political landscape.
The contours of some findings are sharply drawn enough to be visible even through the shadows of potential polling error. Poll after poll has found President Donald Trump’s approval rating in the mid-to-low-30s nationally. Surveys also show a broad consensus that Americans, shaken by cost of living concerns, largely take a dim view of the economy and Trump’s stewardship of it; that there’s little enthusiasm in any corner about the current state of the nation; and that voters are overwhelminglylookingforchange — even if they may not all agree on precisely what that change should look like.
Similarly, Democrats’ lead on the national “generic ballot” has been consistent and robust enough to suggest that the party has an overall advantage — and it would require an unprecedented level of polling error to overcome that. But there’s far less certainty about the precise level of that advantage, or how that might play out in individual races. Even a small difference in Democratic strength compared to what the polls suggest could mean the difference between a blue wave that sweeps well into Republican territory, and one that fails to overcome a deeply Republican-friendly Senate map.
One thing that’s challenging for pollsters this year is that there’s another finding that looks simultaneously like a defining factor of the race and a potential source of polling error: the yawning gap in partisan enthusiasm about voting.
Polls — consistent with early voting data — have found that, compared to Republicans, Democrats report being far more motivated to vote this year. That’s playing a role both in pollsters’ efforts to get people to answer surveys, and in their attempts to identify which potential voters will actually end up casting ballots in this election.
Per Gallup, the Democratic enthusiasm advantage is the largest in any midterm dating back to 1994. That’s in part because, particularly in his second term, Trump provokes far more fervent opposition than he does ardent support. It also owes in part to the growing education divide in American politics, with college-educated voters likelier than those without degrees both to turn out in a midterm year, and to vote Democratic if they do.
But that same enthusiasm divide could also be shaping voters’ willingness to respond to polls.
In a Washington Post-Schar School poll of Kansas, for instance, registered Democrats who were contacted by interviewers were far likelier than registered Republicans to complete the survey. While that disparity hasn’t been universal this cycle, the final set of New York Times/Siena College polls also saw a similar response pattern.
This type of variation, sometimes called “differential nonresponse,” isn’t an entirely new challenge for pollsters. Some types of people have always been more likely than others to answer surveys, including older adults, those with higher levels of education and those who are more civically engaged. Pollsters address that disparity by weighting their results to make the demographics of their sample look more like the broad universe of people they’re trying to measure. Increasingly, that also includes weighting to known partisan targets, such as the levels of party registration in a state or vote choice in the 2024 election.
What concerns pollsters are those patterns that aren’t fully corrected for, even after weighting to demographic and partisan targets. A poll could have the “right” number of Republicans and Democrats to reflect the electorate but not reach the right mix of voters within each party.
Not every registered voter turns out to cast a ballot in each election — in most years, 40% or more sit it out — and that can also complicate the picture for pollsters. In order to reflect the views of those who do ultimately turn out, pollsters identify likely voters, and those efforts can be complicated by the same factors that make it hard to reach less enthused potential voters.
There’s a possibility that some types of Republicans may be too disengaged to respond to surveys, but still sufficiently motivated that they’ll end up voting — or that the most engaged and enthusiastic Democrats will be overrepresented in surveys.
Even if the polls accurately reflect the dynamics at the time they were conducted, there’s still room for a shift after that polling is completed if Republican voters coalesce late around their candidates.
CNN’s final state polls, for instance, gave voters an option to say they wouldn’t support either candidate in the upcoming Senate race — and even after being asked a follow-up question about which way they’d lean, 6% to 8% in each poll said that, between the two leading candidates, they’d back “neither” or someone else. The poll also pressed voters to choose which party they’d rather see in control of the Senate, even if they initially said it didn’t matter to them. Looking at those two questions together tells us that in most of these polls, voters who favor GOP control were more likely than those who’d rather see a Democratic win to opt out of picking a major-party candidate — by about 9 points in Texas, 6 points in Kansas and 4 points in Michigan.
That could well reflect what happens on Election Day. The Republican nominees in Texas and Kansas, Ken Paxton and Roger Marshall, face specific image problems that have made it more difficult for them to consolidate their party’s support, and it’s fully plausible that GOP-inclined voters in those states might end up taking a pass on the race altogether. But it also suggests that Democrats haven’t yet sealed the deal.In a set of relatively tight races, that could be enough to significantly tighten margins or change the outcome of some races altogether.
On the other hand, it’s not a given that any polling miss would be in favor of the Democrats. Presidential polls in the past three cycles have underestimated Republicans’ share of the vote relative to Democrats: by around 3 points in 2016 and 2024, and close to 5 points in 2020.
But there hasn’t been a similar pattern in Trump-era midterm elections. Nor is it guaranteed that polling misses would look the same across the many different states in play.
As we wrote in 2024, polling data is a single, imperfect gauge of people’s opinions. But polls of the US, ultimately, are a means of talking to Americans across a wide range of demographics, life experiences and views, on topics that stretch far beyond elections, or even politics. In a deeply fragmented society, and with social media often reflecting an unrepresentative sample of the loudest voices, they’re still a valuable tool for understanding the country as a whole.
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