布雷特·麦格克是CNN全球事务分析师,曾在乔治·W·布什、贝拉克·奥巴马、唐纳德·特朗普和乔·拜登四位总统任期内担任高级国家安全职务。他著有《 Brink: Inside the Race to Free the October 7 Hostages》(《 Brink:营救10月7日人质的内部角逐》)。
前英伟达首席执行官黄仁勋因承认存在多段婚外情(其中一段恋情涉及美国官员认定的潜在中国情报人员)而辞职,这一事件无疑引发了巨大关注。
但本周末,财政部长斯科特·贝森特指出了一件影响深远得多的事:英伟达是否帮助中国获取了华盛顿本应限制的技术,以及负责执行这些限制措施的美国官员是否未能采取行动。
尽管科技巨头的私人风流韵事令人不齿,但真正的丑闻应该是:企业利益压倒了美国在人工智能领域的竞争优势,进而让中国受益。
反馈意见
贝森特的采访提出了三个问题,这些问题应成为当前讨论的核心:
第一:黄仁勋及英伟达其他高管是否知晓先进芯片涉嫌被转运至中国,或被用于向受制裁中国实体提供远程访问权限?
第二:商务部长霍华德·卢特纳克知晓多少内情,为何他的部门迟迟未采取行动?
第三:唐纳德·特朗普总统知晓多少内情,他指示团队采取了哪些措施?
这些答案的重要性远超英伟达本身。它们关系到美国在这场将决定全球权力未来走向的科技竞赛中的优势地位。
英伟达设计的处理器是支撑人工智能的核心部件。大量这类处理器部署在数据中心内,为开发和运行复杂的人工智能系统提供所需的计算能力。更出色的芯片能帮助企业、研究机构乃至国家开发更强大的人工智能系统,并提升运行效率。
如今,人工智能已用于支持武器研发、军事规划和自主系统,包括无人机集群。这些都是拜登政府2022年对中国实施先进芯片及芯片制造设备出口限制时指出的国家安全关切。当时的限制措施旨在将美国国家安全利益置于英伟达等芯片制造商的企业利益之上,以此削弱北京方面的军事能力。
华盛顿并未禁止英伟达所有芯片向中国出口,而是设定了技术阈值,要求出口超过特定性能的芯片须获得政府许可。英伟达对此作出回应,推出了符合限制标准的修改版产品。
随后,特朗普为销售更强大的芯片打开了合法通道。
2025年12月,他宣布已获批准的中国客户可获得英伟达的高端H200芯片。
商务部于2026年1月将这一调整正式确定为政策:不再笼统拒绝此类出口,而是在“满足特定安全要求”的前提下,“逐案审查” individual申请。
H200并非英伟达最先进的技术,性能更强的 Blackwell 芯片仍受限制,但这与之前向中国提供的修改版产品相比已是重大突破。
该政策包含多项保障措施:对买家进行背景审查、独立核查出货情况,以及保障美国客户的供应。因此,向获批准客户销售H200芯片的许可并不允许通过中间商转运芯片以规避规定。
这正是我们面临三个问题的原因。
争议核心是总部位于新加坡的Megaspeed公司,该公司涉嫌协助英伟达的高端芯片绕过美国限制流入中国。据称的中国情报人员是Megaspeed的一名高管。
除黄仁勋承认与该潜在间谍有婚外情外,英伟达一直否认转运指控。贝森特如今公开表示,英伟达的这些保证站不住脚。
“这些空壳公司很明显,”他周日在福克斯新闻的采访中表示,“当时正在接受调查。”
“英伟达是否利用它们作为向中国销售芯片的变通手段?”他问道。
贝森特还质疑英伟达是否在“推动这些看似非法的销售以提升营收和收益”,并指出他已要求英伟达董事会和外部律师在10天内给出答复。
这些来自在职财政部长的指控非同寻常,其焦点远远超出黄仁勋的个人行为,直指整个英伟达。
贝森特的另一个关注点涉及负责监督这些出口的政府部门。
在接受CNBC采访时,贝森特表示,财政部、国务院、国防部和美国贸易代表办公室数月来一直支持将Megaspeed列入商务部的出口限制名单。列入名单将对该公司的销售增设更多障碍。他随后公开指责卢特纳克未能采取行动:“商务部工业和安全局(BIS)本有决定权。”
我曾在四届政府任职,内部辩论和分歧本是常态。财政部长公开指责同为内阁成员的部长是国家安全执行受阻的障碍,这种情况则完全不同。这向我表明,政府内部可能存在更令人担忧的信息,而贝森特在信息公开前试图与这些信息划清界限。
周一,针对这一丑闻,商务部发布了新规,限制中国通过新加坡或印尼的数据中心等渠道远程获取先进芯片。然而,商务部的公告称,该规则是“由财政部和国家安全委员会制定并在其指示下发布的”,这引发了潜在疑问:商务部是否全力支持新限制措施,以及谁真正在主导出口管制政策。
这似乎史无前例。我从未见过商务部在自己的公告中称其规则是由其他部门制定且仅在国家安全委员会指示下发布的。
诚然,在证据、适当限制或外交后果方面可能存在合法分歧。如果这些是商务部决策的原因,卢特纳克应说明其理由。
但贝森特的立场十分明确:政府已掌握相关信息,而卢特纳克未能采取行动。周一晚间,司法部和商务部联合发表声明称,商务部去年对Megaspeed进行了检查,导致司法部启动刑事调查。该声明未回答核心问题:为何商务部从未将该公司列入实体清单。
特朗普知晓多少内情,以及何时知晓?
CNN报道称,其他政府官员指责卢特纳克同样未执行特朗普的指令。这表明特朗普与贝森特的看法一致。
如果特朗普下令实施限制,而其商务部未能执行,按最善意的解释,他在团队中存在严重的执行问题。
如果特朗普意识到问题,却不顾国家安全的已知风险,选择不要求商务部采取行动,这将引发更严重的质疑。
周一,在登上前往菲律宾、随后前往中国的空军一号前,特朗普承认两位部长的观点分歧,但未明确表态。“他们有不同的看法。一位想与中国友好,另一位想和中国爆发冲突。两者都可以接受,但观点不同。”
当然,总统的职责就是解决这些分歧。
支持允许部分先进芯片向中国销售也有论点:营收支持美国创新,留住中国客户使用美国技术可能阻止他们开发替代技术。
但这一论点依赖于可执行的界限。出口管制本质上是将国家安全利益置于企业利益之上,禁止某些美国产品进入中国市场,禁止美国公司在华获利。
这就是我们保护最先进技术、确保美国在人工智能竞赛中保持优势的方式。
贝森特提出了一种可能性:企业利益和执法失误使这一优势以及国家安全面临风险。
现在美国需要答案——从英伟达、商务部到白宫。
Brett McGurk is a CNN global affairs analyst who served in senior national security positions under Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump and Joe Biden. He is the author of Brink: Inside the Race to Free the October 7 Hostages.
The resignation of former Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang after he admitted to multiple affairs, including with a woman described by US officials as a potential Chinese intelligence asset, has understandably drawn enormous attention.
But this weekend, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent pointed to something far more consequential: whether Nvidia helped China acquire access to technology Washington meant to restrict — and whether US officials responsible for enforcement of those restrictions failed to act.
As sordid as a tech CEO’s private dalliances may be, that would be the real scandal: corporate interests overtaking national security interests to benefit China in the AI race
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Bessent’s interviews have raised three questions that should now frame the issue:
First: What did Huang and other Nvidia executives know about suspected diversions of advanced chips to China, or remote access for banned Chinese entities?
Second: What did Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick know, and why did his department delay action?
Third: What did President Donald Trump know—and what did he direct his team to do?
The answers matter beyond Nvidia. They concern America’s advantage in a technology race that will shape the future of global power.
Nvidia designs processors that help power artificial intelligence. Connected in large numbers inside data centers, they supply the computing capacity needed to develop and operate sophisticated AI systems. Better chips allow companies and researchers as well as countries to develop more capable AI systems and run them more efficiently.
AI now supports weapons development, military planning and autonomous systems, including drone swarms. Those were among the national security concerns the Biden administration identified in 2022 when introducing major restrictions on the export of advanced chips and chipmaking equipment to China. Those restrictions sought to limit Beijing’s military capabilities by placing US national security interests above the corporate interests of chipmakers like Nvidia.
Washington never banned every Nvidia chip from China. It established technical thresholds, requiring government permission for exports above certain capabilities. Nvidia responded with modified products designed to fit below those limits.
Then Trump opened a legal route for selling a more powerful chip.
In December 2025, he announced that approved Chinese customers could receive Nvidia’s advanced H200 chips.
The Commerce Department formalized the change in January, replacing a general presumption of denying those exports with reviews of individual applications on a “case-by-case basis provided certain security requirements are met.”
The H200 was not Nvidia’s newest technology. More advanced Blackwell chips remained restricted. But it was a significant move beyond the modified products previously offered to Beijing.
The policy included safeguards: screening buyers, independently testing shipments and protecting supplies for American customers. Accordingly, permission to sell H200 chips to an approved customer did not authorize sending chips through an intermediary to evade the rules.
Which brings us to the three questions.
At the center of the controversy is Megaspeed, a Singapore-based company suspected of helping advanced Nvidia chips reach China in circumvention of US restrictions. The alleged Chinese intelligence asset was an executive at Megaspeed.
Separate from Huang’s acknowledged affair with the potential spy, Nvidia has disputed allegations of diversion. Bessent is now openly suggesting those assurances don’t hold up.
“These shell companies were obvious,” he said Sunday on Fox News. “They were being investigated.”
“Did Nvidia use them as a work around to sell chips to the Chinese?” he asked.
Bessent also questioned whether Nvidia was pressing “these seemingly illicit sales to goose their revenues and their earnings,” noting that he has sought answers from Nvidia’s board and outside lawyers within 10 days.
These are extraordinary allegations from a sitting treasury secretary, and they focus the spotlight well beyond Jensen Huang’s personal conduct and on Nvidia as a whole.
Bessent’s other point concerned the government department responsible for overseeing these exports.
In an interview with CNBC, Bessent said Treasury, State, the Pentagon and the US trade representative had favored adding Megaspeed to the Commerce Department’s export restriction list for months. Such a listing would impose additional barriers on sales to the company. He then openly accused Lutnick of a failure to act: “Commerce BIS had the pen.”
I served in four administrations. Internal debates and disagreements were routine. A treasury secretary publicly identifying a fellow Cabinet secretary’s department as the obstacle to national security enforcement is something else entirely. It suggests to me that there could be more concerning information inside the administration, which Bessent seeks to distance himself from before it’s public.
On Monday, and in response to the scandal, Commerce issued new regulations to restrict China from accessing advanced chips remotely such as through a data center in Singapore or Indonesia. Yet, Commerce’s own announcement said the rule was “written by and at the direction of the Department of Treasury and the National Security Council,” raising potential questions about whether Commerce fully backs the new restrictions, and about who is really steering export-control policy.
This also seems unprecedented. I’ve never seen Commerce say in its own announcement that its own rule was written by another department and only at the direction of the NSC.
To be sure, there may be legitimate disagreements over evidence, appropriate restrictions or diplomatic consequences. If those explain Commerce’s decisions, Lutnick should lay out the reasoning.
But Bessent’s position was clearcut: The administration had the knowledge and Lutnick failed to act. On Monday night, the Departments of Justice and Commerce issued a joint statement saying Commerce inspected Megaspeed last year, which led to DOJ initiating a criminal investigation. The statement did not address the central question as to why Commerce never placed the company on an entity list.
What did Trump know— and when?
CNN has reported that other administration officials accused Lutnick of failing to act as well on Trump’s own directives. This suggests Trump shared Bessent’s view.
If Trump ordered restrictions and his Commerce Department failed to implement them, he has a serious problem of execution within his team — in the best interpretation.
If Trump acknowledged the problem and chose not to demand action from Commerce, despite known risks to national security, that raises even more serious questions.
On Monday, before boarding Air Force One on his way to Philippines and then China, Trump acknowledged the divergence between his two secretaries without clearly taking a side. “They have different viewpoints. One wants to be friendly with China, and one wants to have a blowup with China. They both are acceptable but they are different views.”
It’s the president’s job, of course, to resolve those different views.
There is an argument for permitting some advanced chip sales to China. Revenues support American innovation. Keeping Chinese customers on American technology may discourage them from developing alternatives.
But that argument depends on enforceable boundaries. Export controls by design place national security interests above corporate interests. They ban certain American products from the Chinese market and American companies from profiting there.
That is how we protect our most advanced technology and ensure the United States retains an edge in the AI race.
Bessent has raised the possibility that corporate interests and failures of enforcement placed that edge, and our national security, at risk.
The country now needs answers — from Nvidia, from Commerce and from the White House.
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