独家:俄罗斯文件曝光伊朗全面合作计划,涵盖核、金融与航空领域


2026-09-20T06:30:51-04:00 / 福克斯新闻网

独家报道: 福克斯新闻数字频道获取并审阅的一份非公开俄罗斯政府文件显示,莫斯科正寻求深化与伊朗的关系,合作范围远超常规贸易——文件规划了替代金融渠道、核能合作、伊朗为俄罗斯飞机生产零部件、大型能源项目以及通往波斯湾的新运输路线。

这份长达44页的俄文文件名为《俄罗斯联邦与伊朗伊斯兰共和国2024-2026年合作计划》,标注“仅供官方使用”,并于2024年9月2日在俄罗斯方面获得批准。文件明确了各部委、机构和国有公司的项目责任,并设定了截至2026年底的完成期限。

专家称:普京与伊朗“急需彼此”,俄方发声支持伊朗现政权

俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京与伊朗总统马苏德·佩泽什基安2026年9月1日在吉尔吉斯斯坦比什凯克举行的上海合作组织峰会间隙会晤时交谈。(克里斯蒂娜·索洛维约娃/基辅社 俄新社 克里姆林宫 via 美联社)

这份文件的制定时间比当前伊朗与美国之间的冲突早一年多,因此无法确定哪些项目仍在推进,也无法得知这场冲突如何改变了莫斯科的计划。

但对这份俄文文件的独立审查以及后续的公开报道显示,路线图中描述的多项举措后来已取得进展或得以落实。

美国国防民主基金会俄罗斯项目研究分析师凯蒂·科尔基亚为福克斯新闻数字频道审阅了这份文件,她表示,该文件的意义不在于单个项目,而在于莫斯科试图为两国关系搭建的整体框架。

“这份路线图并非全新发现:密切关注俄伊关系的人会发现,两国间的许多合作项目多年来早已公开,”科尔基亚在给福克斯新闻数字频道的书面分析中说道。

为何特朗普淡化俄中助伊相关报道

“更具启示意义的是莫斯科试图构建的两国关系架构,”她补充道,并称金融机制、运输路线、能源投资和航空合作等领域的合作,旨在缓解制裁和西方经济施压带来的脆弱性。

“这些非公开的高层文件展现了俄伊两国的全面合作,”一位审阅过材料的欧洲情报消息人士告诉福克斯新闻数字频道。
“这同时也是具有战略意义的敏感议题,高度政治化,聚焦核计划、能源贸易和金融交易等旨在规避美国制裁的领域,”该消息人士表示。

一位不愿具名的美国官员在回应福克斯新闻数字频道关于金融条款的提问时表示,美国制裁已“将俄罗斯和伊朗严重孤立于国际金融体系之外”,因此两国开发替代金融渠道及其他规避制裁方案的行为“并不意外”。

该官员称,华盛顿会密切关注受制裁司法辖区开发替代跨境支付机制的企图,并将设法破坏那些助力规避制裁或开展非法金融活动的机制。

这份俄罗斯文件本身并未使用“规避制裁”一词,而是反复呼吁更多使用本币结算、建立独立金融渠道,并采取措施对抗莫斯科所称的“单边限制性措施”。

特朗普威胁:任何援助伊朗的国家都将面临“前所未有的”经济后果

俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京与伊朗总统马苏德·佩泽什基安2026年9月1日在吉尔吉斯斯坦比什凯克举行的上海合作组织峰会间隙会晤时合影。(维亚切斯拉夫·普罗科菲耶夫/基辅社 俄新社 克里姆林宫 via 美联社)

搭建脱离西方体系的金融渠道

部分最明确的条款涉及俄伊两国的资金流转计划。

该计划设定目标:将双边贸易中本币结算的占比从2024年的68%提升至2026年的71%,同时扩大本币计价的对应账户规模。

更具野心的是,路线图呼吁俄罗斯央行与伊朗央行开发使用央行数字货币进行跨境结算。

另一项条款呼吁“确保使用独立的金融信息传输系统”,包括将金融机构连接至独立的金融信息交换渠道。

文件并未指明将使用何种信息传输系统,也未明确说明其目标是绕过环球银行金融电信协会(SWIFT)或美国金融管控。

分析师警告:俄罗斯为解决预算赤字采取的战略举措可能意外导致卢布贬值。(路透社/达多·鲁维奇/示意图/资料图片)

但这种金融一体化在后来已公开。2025年2月,俄罗斯副总理阿列克谢·奥弗丘克表示,俄伊两国已“几乎完全”通过各自的金融和银行信息传输系统将双边结算转换为本币结算。俄罗斯新闻机构国际文传电讯社报道称,此举是两国推动独立支付基础设施建设的一部分。

伊朗驻俄罗斯大使也在2025年2月表示,德黑兰与莫斯科双边银行业务已无需使用SWIFT,两国正在使用各自的保密银行信息传输系统。他表示,伊朗的Shetab支付系统与俄罗斯的Mir支付系统的互联互通初期阶段已于前一年启动。

科尔基亚称,这些举措的意义具有累积效应。

报告:伊朗政权利用前苏联共和国规避制裁、为战争机器提供资金

伊朗总统马苏德·佩泽什基安2025年11月1日参观伊朗德黑兰的核设施。(伊朗总统府/供图/阿纳多卢通讯社 via 盖蒂图片社)

“单独来看,这些举措无一具有变革性,”她写道。“但综合来看,它们旨在消除俄伊经济关系中的单一脆弱点,并构建冗余应对机制。”

金融领域的努力与政治层面的行动相辅相成。

路线图呼吁俄伊两国通过金砖国家及其他国际机构协调对抗“单边贸易限制”,另一项条款则提议研究对抗“单边限制性措施”及其对全球市场影响的方法。

科尔基亚表示,这超越了简单的规避制裁手段。

“尤其值得注意的是,这份路线图不仅限于实际的制裁规避方案,还包括一场旨在构建反对制裁的思想与外交攻势的努力,”她写道,并提及了针对单边限制措施的专家社区、讨论平台和国际论坛的相关规划。

一位美国官员告诉福克斯新闻数字频道,协助规避制裁的金融机构和中介机构将面临“重大制裁风险”,并补充称华盛顿将继续与合作伙伴一道“在任何制裁规避网络出现时,识别、曝光并破坏这些网络”。

该官员还驳斥了俄伊替代金融系统可能取代西方金融基础设施的说法。

“俄罗斯和伊朗可以尝试构建替代金融渠道,但它们无法复制美元和国际金融体系的覆盖范围、流动性与信任度,”该官员表示。“它们的努力不会削弱美国制裁的有效性。”

新书警告:中、俄、伊、朝形成“侵略轴心”,或可压制美国

2025年12月30日,一名行人走过德黑兰的货币兑换点,当时伊朗里亚尔汇率下跌。(马吉德·阿斯加里普尔/西亚新闻社 via 路透社)

俄原子能集团与伊朗核领域

金融架构与两国关系中另一项具有战略敏感性的支柱并行:民用核能合作。

该计划赋予俄罗斯国家原子能集团(Rosatom)在伊朗布什尔核电站的持续职责,包括为1号机组提供燃料和维护支持,以及继续推进2号和3号机组的建设工作。

此类合作并未仅停留在纸面上。2026年9月2日,俄原子能集团表示,俄罗斯专家已返回布什尔核电站,1号机组正准备进行定期维护和部分燃料更换,核燃料已运抵现场。该集团还称,核电站建设工作仍在继续,预计将有更多俄罗斯专家抵达。

2024年4月29日,伊朗伊斯兰革命卫队的快艇在布什尔核电站附近的波斯湾海域举行海上阅兵,纪念波斯湾国家日。(莫尔塔扎·尼库巴兹/努拉图片社 via 盖蒂图片社)

科尔基亚指出,布什尔核电站2号和3号机组项目早于2024年路线图制定时间,因此该文件并未发起这项合作,而是将现有战略项目纳入了更广泛的俄伊合作框架。

“此类战略与协议证实俄伊两国关系密切,俄罗斯几乎肯定会在2026年继续并旨在扩大当前与伊朗的合作,”这位欧洲情报消息人士表示。

福克斯新闻数字频道已向俄原子能集团征求关于该文件及其在伊朗工作当前状态的置评请求。

能源项目——部分融资信息保密

路线图还明确了莫斯科希望参与的伊朗特定油气田。
文件列出了谢德甘、基什和北帕尔斯油田,并指派俄罗斯能源部和未具名的“相关俄罗斯企业”负责推进这些项目。

文件中未提及这些企业的名称。部分项目的融资栏标注为“保密”。

有证据显示,至少其中一个列名项目已取得进展。
国际文传电讯社2026年2月13日报道称,俄罗斯国营企业ZN-Vostok正在开发伊朗的谢德甘油田,伊朗官员也表示德黑兰希望扩大俄罗斯在更多油气项目中的投资。

路线图为谢德甘项目设定了截至2025年底的里程碑,而基什和北帕尔斯项目的工作则延续至2026年,包括法律、商业和项目分析工作。

这种模式在文件中反复出现:明确列出部委、截止日期和战略目标,但部分参与企业或融资安排未对外披露。

本森警告伊朗的外部支持者“远离”伊朗,特朗普寻求“窒息”德黑兰经济

这张由伊朗国际通讯社(IIPA)提供的照片显示,2010年8月21日,俄罗斯援建的伊朗布什尔核电站反应堆大楼正在装载首批核燃料。(IIPA via 盖蒂图片社)

俄罗斯飞机零部件——伊朗制造?

其中一项较为不同寻常的条款超出了普通贸易范畴。
路线图呼吁俄罗斯协助在伊朗建立俄罗斯飞机零部件和组件的生产基地。

俄罗斯当局被指示确定哪些飞机零部件可在伊朗维修或制造,识别有能力生产这些零部件的伊朗企业,通过俄罗斯航空监管机构罗萨维阿齐亚认证选定的工厂,并签署本地化生产协议。

路线图设定的截止日期为:2026年3月31日前达成本地化生产协议,2026年12月31日前启动原型零部件生产。

公开证据显示,航空合作在飞机维修相关领域取得了进展。
2025年2月,俄罗斯航空监管机构负责人表示,在一架俄航空客A330在德黑兰完成维修后,三家伊朗公司已获得批准,可对俄罗斯运营的飞机进行维修和适航性工作。
俄罗斯政府当月也公开讨论了与伊朗更深入的航空工业合作,包括飞机制造和客运飞机发动机联合研发。

但福克斯新闻数字频道尚未独立核实路线图中更具雄心的条款——在伊朗境内制造俄罗斯飞机零部件——是否已得到落实。

南向贸易路线

文件还规划了加强俄伊物理运输网络的举措。
其中呼吁建设一条采用俄罗斯1520毫米轨距的拟建铁路,该铁路从伊朗与阿塞拜疆的边境延伸至伊朗波斯湾港口。

在路线图中,该提案仍处于规划和谈判阶段。

此外,莫斯科还推动了拉什特-阿斯塔拉铁路项目,这是国际南北运输走廊中一段约162公里的缺失路段。

该项目后来超越了纯概念阶段。
据俄罗斯交通部消息,俄伊两国于2025年5月正式启动该铁路的工程勘测工作。

科尔基亚表示,截至2026年夏末,该项目仍未全面开工,俄伊官员仍在推进实施和建设安排。她还提及了另一项条款:伊朗对俄罗斯阿斯特拉罕港的基础设施投资。

路线图呼吁利用伊朗投资在当地建设一个码头,以及仓库、物流园区和谷物与植物油设施。科尔基亚发现,一家伊朗所有的企业后来在阿斯特拉罕运营了一个带有铁路支线的码头,并正在建设谷物和植物油仓储设施,与路线图的描述高度吻合,尽管文件未提及该企业名称,无法完全确认匹配关系。

综合来看,运输条款指向了构建更少依赖传统欧洲通道的实体贸易路线的努力。

媒体、技术与“信息安全”

路线图的合作范围远超金融和重工业领域。
其中呼吁开展内容交换、记者培训和联合媒体制作,包括至少两个联合项目以及为伊朗记者提供“专业培训”。

文件还呼吁俄罗斯科技公司在伊朗获得至少两份信息通信技术相关合同,涵盖“信息安全”、电信和视频游戏行业。

美国对伊朗的经济封锁达到最大施压力度,风险显现

2025年4月9日的卫星图像显示了伊朗阿巴斯港的拉希德·拉贾伊港。行星实验室公共公司/供图 via 路透社 本图片由第三方提供。必须注明来源(行星实验室公共公司/供图 via 路透社)

普京家族关联的高层负责人

负责俄伊双边关系俄方协调工作的官员与弗拉基米尔·普京的近亲存在直接关联。
俄罗斯能源部长谢尔盖·齐维列夫担任俄伊常设贸易和经济合作委员会俄方主席。

路透社2024年6月普京任命安娜·齐维列娃担任国防部副部长时曾报道,齐维列夫的妻子正是安娜·齐维列娃,她是普京已故表妹、俄罗斯国防部副部长。

这位欧洲情报消息人士认为,这一关联反映了莫斯科对伊朗关系的政治重视程度。

“需要强调的是,在俄罗斯方面,与伊朗的经济合作由弗拉基米尔·普京近亲代表协调和管理,”该消息人士表示。
“这表明伊朗事务并非俄罗斯政府议程中众多官僚问题之一,而是对弗拉基米尔·普京政权具有重大战略价值。”

“同样值得注意的是,这一努力背后的国家协调和制度化程度,”她补充道,并提及了央行、各部委、监管机构和国有公司的参与,以及正式的截止日期和部分项目的保密融资安排。

“这表明莫斯科正试图将本可能只是政治权宜的伙伴关系,转变为更持久、更具制度嵌入性的合作,”科尔基亚说道。

俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京与伊朗外交部长阿巴斯·阿拉克奇2026年4月27日在俄罗斯圣彼得堡鲍里斯·叶利钦总统图书馆举行会晤。(德米特里·洛韦茨基/基辅社 via 路透社)

俄伊两国官员均未回应福克斯新闻数字频道的多次置评请求。福克斯新闻数字频道还向俄原子能集团以及负责俄罗斯参与金砖国家事务的官员征求了意见。

埃弗拉特(埃菲)·拉赫特是福克斯新闻数字频道记者,拥有超过15年报道冲突、全球事务、人权和政治问责的经验。她曾执导并制作了200多段纪录片片段,足迹遍布40多个国家,记录冲突、人道主义危机、腐败、人口贩运、基于性别的暴力以及重大国际事件背后的人文故事。

拉赫特的报道深入中东、欧洲、亚洲和非洲的冲突地区和危机现场。她的工作包括揭露人口贩运网络、曝光叙利亚境内的ISIS地下酷刑监狱、记录乌克兰战争以及采访高级政治人物和世界领导人。她也是俄乌战争爆发后进入俄罗斯采访普京反对派证词的西方记者之一。拉赫特曾获得2022年佩雷斯和平中心和平奖,并曾担任2023-2024年度密歇根大学奈特-华莱士新闻奖学金得主。她还曾两次获得洛克沃尔优秀报道奖。她拥有传播学学士学位和政治学硕士学位。

EXCLUSIVE: Russian document reveals sweeping Iran plan spanning nuclear, finance and aviation

2026-09-20T06:30:51-04:00 / Fox News

EXCLUSIVE:A nonpublic Russian government document obtained and reviewed by Fox News Digital reveals how Moscow sought to deepen its relationship with Iran far beyond conventional trade — laying out plans for alternative financial channels, nuclear cooperation, Iranian production of Russian aircraft components, major energy projects and new transportation routes stretching toward the Persian Gulf.

The 44-page Russian-language document, titled “Plan for Cooperation Between the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran for 2024-2026,” is marked “For official use” and was approved on the Russian side on Sept. 2, 2024. It assigns ministries, agencies and state companies responsibility for projects and sets deadlines extending through the end of 2026.

PUTIN AND IRAN ‘NEED EACH OTHER DESPERATELY,’ EXPERT SAYS, AS RUSSIA VOICES SUPPORT FOR REGIME

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian talk during their meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on Tuesday, Sept. 1, 2026.(Kristina Solovyova/Pool Sputnik Kremlin via AP)

The document predates the current war involving Iran and the United States by well over a year, meaning it does not establish which projects remain active or how the conflict may have altered Moscow’s plans.

But an independent review of the Russian-language document, along with subsequent public reporting, shows that a number of initiatives described in the roadmap later advanced or materialized.

Keti Korkiya, a research analyst with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Russia Program, reviewed the document for Fox News Digital and said its significance lies less in any single project than in the architecture Moscow was trying to build around the relationship.

“The roadmap is not revelatory: people paying close attention to the relationship between Russia and Iran will see many collaborations between the two countries that have been public for years,” Korkiya said in written analysis provided to Fox News Digital.

WHY TRUMP IS DOWNPLAYING REPORTS RUSSIA AND CHINA ARE HELPING IRAN

Russian President Vladimir Putin shakes hands with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi during a meeting at the Boris Yeltsin Presidential Library in Saint Petersburg, Russia April 27, 2026.(Dmitri Lovetsky/Pool via Reuters)

“What is more revealing is the architecture of the relationship Moscow is trying to build,” she said, pointing to financial mechanisms, transportation routes, energy investment and aviation cooperation as different ways of reducing vulnerabilities created by sanctions and Western economic pressure.

“These are nonpublic high-level documents that illustrate the comprehensive cooperation between Russia and Iran,” a European intelligence source who reviewed the material told Fox News Digital.

“It is also strategic, sensitive and highly politicized, focusing on areas like nuclear programs, energy trade and financial transactions that aim to evade the U.S. sanctions,” the source said.

A U.S. official, responding on background to questions from Fox News Digital about the financial provisions, said U.S. sanctions have “severely isolated Russia and Iran from the international financial system,” adding that efforts by the two countries to develop alternative financial channels and other sanctions-evasion schemes were therefore “not surprising.”

The official said Washington closely tracks attempts by sanctioned jurisdictions to develop alternative cross-border payment mechanisms and would seek to disrupt those that facilitate sanctions evasion or illicit finance.

The Russian document itself does not use the phrase “sanctions evasion.” Instead, it repeatedly calls for increased use of national currencies, independent financial channels and measures to counter what Moscow describes as “unilateral restrictive measures.”

TRUMP THREATENS ‘UNPRECEDENTED’ ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR ANY NATION AIDING IRAN

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian pose for a photo during their meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on Tuesday, Sept. 1, 2026.(Vyacheslav Prokofyev/Pool Sputnik Kremlin via AP)

BUILDING FINANCIAL CHANNELS OUTSIDE WESTERN SYSTEMS

Some of the clearest provisions concern how Russia and Iran intended to move money.

The plan set a target of increasing the share of bilateral trade conducted in national currencies from 68% in 2024 to 71% by 2026, while also seeking to expand correspondent accounts denominated in national currencies.

More ambitiously, the roadmap calls for the Bank of Russia and the Central Bank of Iran to develop the use of central bank digital currencies for cross-border settlements.

Another provision calls for “ensuring the use of independent systems for transmitting financial messages,” including connecting financial institutions to independent channels for exchanging financial information.

The document does not identify which messaging system would be used or explicitly state that the goal was to bypass SWIFT or U.S. financial controls.

Strategic moves by Russia to address its budget deficit may inadvertently devalue the ruble, analysts warn.(REUTERS/Dado Ruvic/Illustration/File Photo)

But some of that financial integration later became public.

In February 2025, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk said Russia and Iran had “practically completely” shifted bilateral settlements into national currencies using their own systems for transmitting financial and banking messages. Interfax, a Russian news agency, reported that the effort was part of a broader push toward independent payment infrastructure between the two countries.

Iran’s ambassador to Russia also said in February 2025 that Tehran and Moscow no longer needed SWIFT for bilateral banking relations and were using their own confidential bank-messaging systems. He said the initial phase of linking Iran’s Shetab payment network with Russia’s Mir system had begun the previous year.

Korkiya said the significance of those measures is cumulative.

IRAN REGIME USES FORMER SOVIET REPUBLIC TO DODGE SANCTIONS, FUND WAR MACHINE: REPORT

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian visits nuclear facilities in Tehran, Iran on Nov. 1, 2025.(Iranian Presidency / Handout/Anadolu via Getty Images)

“Individually, none of these initiatives is transformative,” she wrote. “Collectively, however, they amount to an attempt to remove single points of vulnerability and build redundancy into the Russia-Iran economic relationship.”

The financial effort is paired with a political one.

The roadmap calls for Russia and Iran to coordinate through BRICS and other international institutions against “unilateral trade restrictions,” while another provision proposes studying ways to counter “unilateral restrictive measures” and their impact on global markets.

Korkiya said that goes beyond simply finding workarounds.

“Especially interesting is that the roadmap also goes beyond practical sanctions workarounds and includes an effort to build an intellectual and diplomatic campaign against sanctions themselves,” she wrote, citing plans for expert communities, discussion platforms and an international forum focused on unilateral restrictions.

A U.S. official told Fox News Digital that financial institutions and intermediaries enabling sanctions evasion expose themselves to “significant sanctions risks,” adding that Washington would continue working with partners to “identify, expose and disrupt these networks wherever they emerge.”

The official also pushed back on the idea that alternative Russia-Iran systems could displace Western financial infrastructure.

“Russia and Iran can try to build alternative financial channels, but they cannot replicate the reach, liquidity or trust of the U.S. dollar and the international financial system,” the official said. “Their efforts will not weaken the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions.”

CHINA, RUSSIA, IRAN AND NORTH KOREA FORM ‘AXIS OF AGGRESSORS’ THAT COULD OVERWHELM US, BOOK WARNS

A person walks past a sign at a currency exchange, as the value of the Iranian Rial drops, in Tehran, Iran, December 30, 2025.(Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via Reuters)

ROSATOM AND IRAN’S NUCLEAR SECTOR

The financial architecture sits alongside another strategically sensitive pillar of the relationship: civilian nuclear energy.

The plan assigns Russia’s state nuclear corporation Rosatom continued responsibility at Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant, including fuel and maintenance support for Unit 1 and continuing construction work associated with Units 2 and 3.

The cooperation did not remain solely on paper.

On Sept. 2, 2026, Rosatom said Russian specialists had begun returning to Bushehr, that Unit 1 was preparing for scheduled maintenance and partial fuel replacement, and that nuclear fuel had already been delivered to the site. Rosatom also said work was continuing on the plant and that additional Russian specialists were expected to arrive.

An Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps speedboat sails in the Persian Gulf during an IRGC marine parade marking Persian Gulf National Day near the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Bushehr, Iran, on April 29, 2024.(Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto via Getty Images)

Korkiya noted that the Bushehr Units 2 and 3 project predates the 2024 roadmap, meaning the document did not originate that cooperation but rather incorporated an existing strategic project into the broader Russia-Iran framework.

“Such strategies and protocols confirm that Russia and Iran are closely aligned countries, and Russia almost certainly continues and aims to increase its current cooperation with Iran also in 2026,” the European intelligence source said.

Fox News Digital sought comment from Rosatom on the document and the current status of its work in Iran.

ENERGY PROJECTS — WITH SOME FINANCING KEPT CONFIDENTIAL

The roadmap also identifies specific Iranian oil and gas fields where Moscow sought a role.

It names Shadegan, Kish and North Pars, assigning Russia’s Energy Ministry and unspecified “interested Russian companies” responsibility for advancing the projects.

Those companies are not named in the roadmap. For several projects, the financing column is marked “Confidential.”

There is evidence that at least one of the named projects advanced.

Interfax reported on Feb. 13, 2026 that Russian state-owned ZN-Vostok was developing Iran’s Shadegan oil field, while Iranian officials said Tehran hoped to expand Russian investment across additional oil and gas projects.

The roadmap sets milestones for Shadegan through the end of 2025, while work involving Kish and North Pars runs into 2026 and includes legal, commercial and project-analysis work.

That pattern appears repeatedly through the document: ministries, deadlines and strategic objectives are spelled out, while some of the participating companies or financing arrangements remain undisclosed.

BESSENT WARNS IRAN’S OUTSIDE BACKERS TO ‘STAY AWAY’ AS TRUMP SEEKS TO ‘ASPHYXIATE’ TEHRAN’S ECONOMY

This handout image supplied by the IIPA (Iran International Photo Agency) shows a view of the reactor building at the Russian-built Bushehr nuclear power plant as the first fuel is loaded, on August 21, 2010 in Bushehr, southern Iran.(Photo by IIPA via Getty Images)

RUSSIAN AIRCRAFT PARTS — MADE IN IRAN?

One of the more unusual provisions goes beyond ordinary trade.

The roadmap calls for Russia to help establish production in Iran of individual parts and assemblies for Russian aircraft.

Russian authorities were instructed to determine which aircraft parts could be repaired or manufactured in Iran, identify Iranian companies capable of producing them, certify selected sites through Russia’s aviation regulator Rosaviatsiya and conclude a localization agreement.

The roadmap set a March 31, 2026 deadline for an agreement on localized production and a Dec. 31, 2026 target for launching prototype production.

Public evidence does show that aviation cooperation advanced in the related area of aircraft maintenance.

In February 2025, Rosaviatsiya’s chief said three Iranian companies had been approved to perform maintenance and airworthiness work on Russian-operated aircraft after an Aeroflot Airbus A330 underwent maintenance in Tehran.

The Russian government also publicly discussed deeper aviation-industrial cooperation with Iran that month, including aircraft manufacturing and joint work on jet engines for passenger aircraft.

But Fox News Digital has not independently verified that the more ambitious provision in the roadmap — manufacturing Russian aircraft components inside Iran — was implemented.

A TRADE ROUTE SOUTH

The document also lays out an effort to strengthen the physical transportation network linking Russia and Iran.

It calls for work on a proposed railway built to Russia’s 1,520-millimeter track gauge, stretching from Iran’s border with Azerbaijan toward Iranian ports on the Persian Gulf.

The proposal remained in the planning and negotiation stage in the roadmap.

Separately, Moscow sought to advance the Rasht-Astara railway, a roughly 162-kilometer missing link in the International North-South Transport Corridor.

That project subsequently moved beyond the purely conceptual stage.

Russia and Iran formally launched engineering surveys for the railway in May 2025, according to Russia’s Transport Ministry.

Korkiya said the project had still not reached full construction by late summer 2026, with Russian and Iranian officials continuing to work on the implementation and construction arrangements. She also identified another provision: Iranian investment in port infrastructure in Astrakhan, Russia.

The roadmap calls for a terminal there using Iranian investment, along with warehouses, a logistics park and grain and vegetable-oil facilities. Korkiya found that an Iranian-owned company later operated a terminal in Astrakhan with a railway spur and was building grain and vegetable-oil storage facilities that closely tracked the roadmap’s description, although the document does not identify that company by name and the match cannot be definitively established.

Taken together, the transport provisions point to an effort to build physical trade routes that are less dependent on traditional European corridors.

MEDIA, TECHNOLOGY AND “INFORMATION SECURITY”

The roadmap reaches well beyond finance and heavy industry.

It calls for content exchange, journalist training and joint media production, including at least two joint projects and ‘professional training’ for Iranian journalists.

It also calls for Russian technology companies to secure at least two contracts in Iran involving information and communications technology, including “information security,” telecommunications and the video-game industry.

US ECONOMIC CHOKEHOLD ON IRAN REACHES PEAK LEVERAGE AS COLLAPSE RISKS EMERGE

A satellite image shows Shahid Rajaee port in Bandar Abbas, Iran April 9, 2025. Planet Labs PBC/Handout via REUTERS THIS IMAGE HAS BEEN SUPPLIED BY A THIRD PARTY. MANDATORY CREDIT(Planet Labs PBC/Handout via REUTERS)

A PUTIN FAMILY CONNECTION AT THE TOP

The official overseeing the Russian side of the relationship also has a direct connection to President Vladimir Putin’s extended family.

Russian Energy Minister Sergei Tsivilev chairs the Russian side of the Permanent Russian-Iranian Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation.

Tsivilev is married to Anna Tsivileva, a Russian deputy defense minister and the daughter of Putin’s late cousin, Reuters reported when Putin appointed her to the Defense Ministry in June 2024.

The European intelligence source argued that the connection reflects the political importance Moscow attaches to Iran.

“It should be emphasized that on Russia’s part, the economic cooperation with Iran is coordinated and managed by a representative of Vladimir Putin’s extended family,” the source said.

“This indicates that the Iranian matter is not just one of many bureaucratic issues in the agenda of the Russian government. But it holds significant value for the interest of the Vladimir Putin regime.”

“What is also notable is the degree of state coordination and institutionalization behind this effort,” she said, pointing to the involvement of central banks, ministries, regulators and state companies, as well as formal deadlines and confidential financing in some projects.

“That suggests Moscow is trying to turn what could otherwise remain a politically convenient partnership into something more durable and bureaucratically embedded,” Korkiya said.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi attend a meeting at the Boris Yeltsin Presidential Library in Saint Petersburg, Russia April 27, 2026.(Dmitri Lovetsky/Pool via Reuters)

Russian and Iranian officials did not respond to multiple requests for comment from Fox News Digital. Fox News Digital also sought comment from Rosatom and from Russian officials responsible for Moscow’s participation in BRICS.

Efrat (Effie) Lachter is a reporter for Fox News Digital with more than 15 years of experience covering conflict, global affairs, human rights and political accountability.She has directed and produced more than 200 documentary segments across more than 40 countries, documenting conflicts, humanitarian crises, corruption, human trafficking, gender-based violence and the human stories behind major world events.

Lachter’s reporting has taken her into conflict zones and crisis areas across the Middle East, Europe, Asia and Africa. Her work has included uncovering human trafficking networks, revealing an ISIS underground torture prison in Syria, documenting the war in Ukraineand interviewing senior political figures and world leaders. She was also among the Western journalists who entered Russia after the war began to bring testimonies from Putin’s opposition. Lachter is the recipient of the 2022 Peres Center for Peace Award and was a 2023–2024 Knight-Wallace Journalism Fellow at the University of Michigan. She also won two Rockower Awards for Excellence in Reporting. She holds a bachelor’s degree in communication and a master’s degree in political science.

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